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Summary
In evaluative conditioning, the liking of a stimulus (the conditioned stimulus; CS) is
being changed by pairing it with another either liked or disliked stimulus (the un-
conditioned stimulus; US). In terms of classical Pavlovian conditioning, the shift in
the evaluative response can be referred to as a conditioned response. In the last two
decades, there has been a great deal of research on whether this type of Pavlovian
conditioning depends on controlled (conscious) processes, and particularly the par-
ticipants’ explicit knowledge about the stimulus pairings (contingency awareness).
The empirical evidence on the (causal) role of contingency awareness in evaluative
conditioning, however, is rather inconsistent. Whereas some studies found condition-
ing effects in the absence of contingency knowledge, others reported the effect to be
restricted to contingency-aware participants. Most researchers refer to contingency
knowledge as the recognition of CS-US pairings in a test after conditioning. The con-
tingency recognition performance is thus expected to depend on several cognitive re-
sources like attention and working memory. Only a few studies separately addressed
the role of these cognitive factors in the acquisition awareness and evaluative con-
ditioning. Furthermore, the propositional knowledge about the CS-US contingency
may be more or less sophisticated. In addition to merely memorizing the stimulus
pairings (contiguities), a participant might, for example, learn something about the
statistical contingency between stimuli, as well. The effects of these cognitive fac-
tors on evaluative learning was investigated in the experiments of this dissertation.
A model describing the relation between different propositional-learning processes
that may influence the acquisition of contingency knowledge and evaluative condi-
tioning is presented in the synopsis. The thesis comprises three manuscripts that are
reporting five experiments in total on the impact of attention, working memory and
propositional knowledge about the CS-US contingencies (contingency judgments)
on the occurrence and the magnitude of evaluative conditioning.
In manuscript A, an experiment is reported (N = 109) that investigated the
6kind of attention required in evaluative learning. Particularly, it was tested whether
attention, rather than contingency awareness, is sufficient for evaluative conditioning
to occur. In principle, attention can be focused either on the stimuli (the CS and the
US) or on the contingency between the stimuli. Since the acquisition of contingency
awareness might require a focus on the CS-US contingency, it would be interesting
to see whether evaluative conditioning occurs if attention is paid to the stimuli but
not to the contingencies. Therefore, three secondary tasks were implemented during
conditioning in which the focus of attention was either directed to the stimulus
contingencies, diverted completely from the stimuli, or diverted selectively only from
the contingencies while maintaining a stimulus focus. Evaluative conditioning effects
occurred only in those participants who attended the CS-US contingencies, but not
when attention was diverted from the stimuli or from the contingencies. These results
show that mere attention is not sufficient for evaluative conditioning to occur, if
attention is diverted selectively from the CS-US contingencies. Since a contingency
focus is assumed to be essential for the acquisition of contingency awareness, the
results are in line with the assumption that evaluative conditioning relies on the
participants’ CS-US awareness during the acquisition.
In addition to requiring a specific form of attention, the acquisition of contingency
knowledge is assumed to depend on working memory resources being available dur-
ing the exposure to the CS-US pairings. In a series of three experiments (N = 109)
reported in manuscript B, working memory capacity was manipulated during eval-
uative conditioning by means of phonological distraction. Particularly, in a verbal
conditioning paradigm, the encoding of the CS-US contingencies (pairs of words) was
disrupted by the playback of irrelevant speech which is assumed to gain automatic
access to the same working memory module. Both, the processing and the produc-
tion of irrelevant speech were shown to reduce both contingency memory and the
magnitude of evaluative conditioning. These results imply that evaluative learning
requires working memory resources, and they challenge the assumption that eval-
uative conditioning relies on automatic processes. However, the conditioning effect
was not restricted to participants who were able to recall the CS-US contingencies
in these experiments. Thus, though working memory may be important during con-
ditioning in order to encode the CS-US contingencies, evaluative learning does not
necessarily depend on the acquisition of long-term knowledge about the contingen-
cies.
7Manuscript C is concerned with the content of the contingency knowledge. Accord-
ing to the propositional account, evaluative conditioning is assumed to rely on the
formation and evaluation of propositional knowledge about the predictive relation
between CS and US. Thus, stronger evaluative conditioning effects may be expected
if the participants perceive a strong statistical CS-US contingency than if they per-
ceive a weak contingency. In the experiment reported in manuscript C (N = 31),
the evaluative conditioning procedure was combined with a contingency learning
paradigm requiring the participants to simultaneously judge the contingencies of
four CS-US pairings. The subjective appraisal of contingency was manipulated by
varying (a) the objective CS-US contingency and (b) the density of the US which
is known to bias contingency judgments (the outcome density effect). This method
allows to modulate propositional knowledge about the contingency independently
of objective values of contingency during the acquisition of evaluative condition-
ing. Indeed, contingencies were judged to be stronger in case of low US density
irrespective of the level of the objective contingency. More importantly, compara-
ble effects of evaluative conditioning occurred with low and with high objective
contingency, but the magnitude of conditioning increased with subjective contin-
gency judgments. These results indicate that evaluative conditioning is sensitive to
propositional knowledge about the CS-US relations (i.e. contingency judgments).
Evaluative conditioning appears to (a) depend on contingency awareness and (b)
vary with subjective beliefs about the CS-US contingency. This result is in line with
the propositional account of evaluative conditioning.
Taken together, the results show (a) that evaluative conditioning depends on those
cognitive resources (i.e. attention and working memory) which enable the acquisition
of contingency knowledge and (b) that propositional knowledge modulates the mag-
nitude of the conditioning effect. It is difficult to explain these findings by referring
to evaluative conditioning as an automatic process of association formation. Rather,
the results imply that propositional learning about the CS-US contingencies is in-
volved in the acquisition of evaluative responses. This form of affective-evaluative
learning was shown to require a specific focus of attention (a contingency focus) as
well as working memory resources to be available during acquisition. Furthermore,
the liking of a CS seems change as a function of the subjective appraisal of the
statistical CS-US contingency.
Zusammenfassung
Die subjektive Bewertung eines Reizes kann sich dadurch vera¨ndern, dass man den
Reiz (konditionierter Stimulus; CS) mit einem entweder positiven oder negativen
Reiz (unkonditionierter Stimulus; US) paart. Diesen Effekt bezeichnet man als eva-
luatives Konditionieren, wobei sich - analog zum klassischen Konditionieren - die
konditionierte Reaktion auf die evaluativen Vera¨nderungen bezieht. In den letzten
20 Jahren bescha¨ftigten sich zahlreiche Untersuchungen mit der Frage, ob diese Form
assoziativen Lernens von kontrollierten (bewussten) Prozessen abha¨ngt. Besonders
widerspru¨chlich sind die Ergebnisse hierbei in Bezug auf die Frage, ob evaluatives
Konditionieren darauf beruht, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen CS und US bewusst
erkannt wird (Kontingenz-Awareness). Wa¨hrend einige Untersuchungen zeigen, dass
evaluatives Konditionieren auch ohne Kontingenz-Awareness auftreten kann, berich-
teten andere, dass ein Konditionierungseffekt nur bei Probanden auftrat, die sich der
Kontingenzen bewusst waren. Da sich die Kontingenz-Awareness auf das explizite
Erinnern des CS-US Zusammenhangs bezieht, sollte sie von kognitiven Faktoren, ins-
besondere von einem bestimmten Aufmerksamkeitsfokus und der Arbeitsgeda¨chtnis
wa¨hrend der Konditionierung, abha¨ngen. Neben dem bloßen Erinnern von Stimulus-
Paarungen (Kontiguita¨t) kann sich das propositionale Wissen eines Probanden u¨ber
die Beziehung zwischen CS und US auch auf den genaueren statistischen Zusammen-
hang zwischen CS und US (Kontingenz) beziehen. In der Synopse wird ein Rahmen-
modell vorgestellt, in dem die vermuteten Beziehungen zwischen den verschiedenen
kognitiven Faktoren propositionalen Lernens und der Entstehung von Kontingenz-
Awareness und evaluativem Konditionieren dargestellt sind. Die vorliegende Arbeit
umfasst drei Manuskripte, in denen fu¨nf Experimente beschrieben werden. Dabei
wurde (a) die selektive Aufmerksamkeit, (b) die Arbeitsgeda¨chtniskapazita¨t und (c)
das propositionale Wissen u¨ber die Stimuluszusammenha¨nge (Kontingenz-Urteile)
wa¨hrend der evaluativen Konditionierung manipuliert. Gemessen wurden jeweils das
Ausmaß des Konditionierungseffektes sowie die Kontingenz-Awareness.
9In einem in Manuskript A beschriebenen Experiment (N = 109) wurde die Rol-
le des spezifischen Aufmerksamkeitsfokus wa¨hrend der Konditionierung untersucht.
Dabei wurde die Hypothese u¨berpru¨ft, ob Effekte evaluativer Konditionierung auch
ohne Kontingenz-Awareness auftreten, wenn die Aufmerksamkeit auf die relevanten
Stimuli (CS und US) gerichtet wird. Dazu wurde der Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit
wa¨hrend der Konditionierung in drei experimentellen Bedingungen entweder (a) auf
die CS-US-Kontingenzen gerichtet (Kontingenz-Fokus), (b) vollsta¨ndig abgelenkt
oder (c) selektiv nur von den CS-US Kontingenzen abgelenkt wa¨hrend sie auf die
Stimuli selbst gelenkt wurde (Stimulus-Fokus). Falls bloße Aufmerksamkeit hinrei-
chend ist, dann sollten sich auch in der letzten Gruppe Effekte evaluativen Kondi-
tionierens zeigen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen aber, dass ein Effekt evaluativen Konditio-
nierens trotz eines Stimulus-Fokus nicht auftritt, wenn die Aufmerksamkeit selektiv
von der Kontingenz zwischen den Stimuli abgelenkt wird. Konditionierungseffekte
zeigten sich nur bei Probanden, die ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf die CS-US Kontin-
genzen richteten. Wichtiger als bloße Aufmerksamkeit scheint also ein spezifischer
Kontingenz-Fokus zu sein. Außerdem traten Konditionierungseffekte nur bei Pro-
banden auf, die sich der Kontingenzen bewusst waren. Die Ergebnisse unterstu¨tzen
daher die Annahme, dass evaluatives Konditionieren auf bewusstem Wissen u¨ber
die Stimulus-Kontingenzen beruht.
Neben der Aufmerksamkeit, sollte die verfu¨gbare Arbeitsgeda¨chtniskapazita¨t
wa¨hrend der Konditionierung ein weiterer limitierender kognitiver Faktor bei der
Entstehung von Kontingenz-Awareness sein. Darum werden in Manuskript B drei
Experimente zur Rolle des Arbeitsgeda¨chtnisses beim evaluativen Konditionieren
beschrieben (N = 109). In diesen wurde die verfu¨gbare Arbeitsgeda¨chtniskapazita¨t
experimentell reduziert, indem wa¨hrend der Konditionierung mit verbalen Stimu-
li irrelevante Sprache wiedergegeben wurde. Hierdurch sollte die Enkodierung von
CS-US Wortpaaren im Arbeitsgeda¨chtnis gesto¨rt werden, da die irrelevante Sprache
mit den CS-US-Paaren um den Zugang zum phonologischen Speicher konkurriert.
Irrelevante Sprache sollte also mit geringerer Kontingenz-Awareness einhergehen.
Tatsa¨chlich zeigte sich, dass sowohl die Wiedergabe als auch das aktive Produzieren
irrelevanter Sprache zu einer Sto¨rung des Kontingenz-Geda¨chtnisses und zu einer Be-
eintra¨chtigung der evaluativen Konditionierung fu¨hrt. Die erwarteten Bewertungs-
vera¨nderungen traten nur auf, wenn die Probanden wa¨hrend der Konditionierung
u¨ber ausreichend Arbeitsgeda¨chtniskapazita¨t verfu¨gten. In diesen Experimenten trat
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evaluatives Konditionieren allerdings nicht nur bei Probanden auf, welche sich nach
der Konditionierung an die CS-US-Paarungen erinnerten. Obwohl ausreichend Ar-
beitsgeda¨chtniskapazita¨t beno¨tigt wird um die CS-US-Kontingenzen wa¨hrend der
Konditionierung zu enkodieren, scheint der Erwerb von Langzeit-Wissen u¨ber die
CS-US-Zusammenha¨nge also nicht entscheidend zu sein.
Manuskript C bescha¨ftigt sich mit dem Inhalt des propositionalen Wissens beim
evaluativen Konditionieren. Nach dem propositionalen Erkla¨rungsansatz beruht eva-
luatives Konditionieren auf dem Erwerb und der Beurteilung von propositionalem
Wissen u¨ber die CS-US Kontingenz. Hierbei ko¨nnte ein Proband auch u¨ber Wis-
sen bezu¨glich der Sta¨rke des pra¨diktiv-statistischen Zusammenhangs zwischen CS
und US (Kontingenz) verfu¨gen. Man ko¨nnte also gro¨ßere Konditionierungseffekte
erwarten, je ho¨her die CS-US Kontingenz subjektiv eingescha¨tzt wird. Um dies zu
untersuchen wurde in dem in Manuskript C beschriebenen Experiment (N = 31)
die subjektive Wahrnehmung der CS-US Kontingenz experimentell manipuliert. Da-
zu wurde (a) die objektive CS-US Kontingenz und (b) die Auftretensdichte der
affektiven Reize (US) variiert. Die Dichte der US sollte sich unabha¨ngig von der
objektiven CS-US Kontingenz auf die subjektiven Einstufungen der Kontingenz
auswirken (Outcome density effect). Die Aufgabe der Probanden war es, die sta-
tistischen Zusammenha¨nge von mehreren CS-US-Paaren wa¨hrend der evaluativen
Konditionierung einzustufen (Kontingenzurteile). Wenn evaluatives Konditionieren
von propositionalem Wissens u¨ber die CS-US Kontingenz abha¨ngt, dann sollten hohe
Kontingenzurteile mit gro¨ßeren Konditionierungseffekten einhergehen. Obwohl die
Probanden Variationen in der objektiven Kontingenz bemerkten, beurteilten sie die
Kontingenzen als sta¨rker, wenn der jeweilige US insgesamt seltener auftrat. Es zeig-
ten sich allerdings a¨hnlich große Konditionierungseffekte bei hoher wie bei niedriger
objektiver Kontingenz. Unabha¨ngig davon konnten sta¨rkere Konditionierungseffek-
te nachgewiesen werden, je ho¨her die CS-US Kontingenz subjektiv eingestuft wur-
de. Die Ergebnisse suggerieren also, dass evaluatives Konditionieren vielmehr durch
die subjektive Wahrnehmung statistischer Kontingenz (propositionales Wissen) als
durch die Variation der objektiven Kontingenzen beeinflusst wird.
Insgesamt sprechen die Ergebnisse dafu¨r, dass evaluatives Konditionieren von ko-
gnitiven Ressourcen abha¨ngt, die zu Kontingenz-Awareness fu¨hren (Aufmerksamkeit
und Arbeitsgeda¨chtnis). Zudem zeigte sich, dass sta¨rkere Bewertungsvera¨nderungen
mit ho¨heren CS-US Kontingenzurteilen einhergehen. Es ist schwierig, diese Befun-
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de mit Theorien zu erkla¨ren, die annehmen, dass evaluatives Konditionieren auf
(unbewusster) automatischer Assoziationsbildung beruht. Stattdessen sprechen die
Befunde dafu¨r, dass kognitive Faktoren und (bewusstes) propositionales Wissen u¨ber
den Zusammenhang zwischen CS und US an der Entstehung evaluativen Konditio-
nierens beteiligt sind. Wa¨hrend der Darbietung der CS-US Paare wird dazu ein
bestimmter Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit (Kontingenz-Fokus) und ausreichend Ar-
beitsgeda¨chtniskapazita¨t beno¨tigt. Außerdem scheint sich die Bewertung eines CS
umso mehr zu vera¨ndern, je sta¨rker der statistische Zusammenhang zwischen CS
und US subjektiv eingescha¨tzt wird.
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Part I.
Synopsis
1. Theoretical Background
1.1. Introduction
Any form of cognition or behavior involves an individual history of learning (Shanks,
1995) which can be defined as relatively permanent changes in apparent or latent
behavior that result from experience (or reinforced practice; Kimble, 1967). Learning
allows an organism to understand about the (causal) structure of the physical or
social environment, and it is necessary to respond in apposite ways. In order to
approach food or to avoid threats, for instance, an organism has to learn something
about the predictive relationship between the occurrence of certain cues (e.g., a
paricular smell) and their consequences (outcomes like food or threat).
According to an associative view of learning, the acquisition of knowledge is based
on connections between sensory experiences. Contemporary theories of associative
learning treat Pavlovian conditioning (Pavlov, 1927) as a general principle of learn-
ing: An organism learns to associate a neutral stimulus with a significant event and
eventually it shows a conditioned response whenever the previously neutral stim-
ulus occurs. Thus, learning refers to the acquisition of representations of stimulus
relations, and it can be distinguished from behavior (Lachnit, 1993, p. 30). How-
ever, depending on their professional perspective, psychologists differ with respect
to what exactly is meant by the term ‘learning’. Behaviorists refer to learning as
the emergence of new responses (e.g., Watson, 1913). Thus, the dog in a Pavlovian
conditioning setting is considered to have learned something only if he shows a new
response when being confronted with a bell: he salivates. By contrast, a more cog-
nitive definition does not restrict learning to observable behavior, but rather to any
‘process that allows a transition from one mental state to another’ (Shanks, 1995).
In addition to behavioral responses, learning can thus also involve the acquisition
of knowledge (e.g., about the spatial or temporal relations between stimuli), prefer-
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ences or attitudes that do not necessarily lead to overt behavior. The Pavlovian dog
may thus have learned something about the relationship between the bell and food
already before he starts salivating: he might have acquired an expectation about the
delivery of food. Nevertheless, this cognitive definition has its shortcomings, as well
(e.g., with regard to the distinction between learning and forgetting; Shanks, 1995).
Related to these divergent conceptions of learning, Pavlovian conditioning pro-
cedures differ with regard to the conditioned responses that are addressed. The
responses may consist in overt behavior (e.g., approach or avoidance) or autonomic
responses (e.g., skin conductance responses), as well as in causality judgments or
attitude measures (at least in human subjects). It has been argued that human be-
havior is determined to a large extent by attitudes, and particularly by subjective
likes and disliked (e.g., Martin & Levey, 1978). Since most of these attitudes are not
innate but have been learned individually (Rozin & Millman, 1987), several studies
have been concerned with the acquisition and with the change of likes and dislikes
by conditioning in the last 35 years (see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001).
This form of affective-evaluative learning is outlined in the next section.
1.2. Evaluative conditioning
Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a form of learning in which the liking of a
stimulus (the conditioned stimulus; CS) changes as a result of repeatedly pairing it
with either a liked or a disliked stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus; US). Thus, the
main procedural difference between EC and other forms of Pavlovian conditioning
is the fact that the conditioned response is a change in the subjective liking of a
stimulus (the evaluative response) rather than in behavioral or autonomic responses
(see De Houwer, 2007). Typically, the evaluation of the CS changes in the direction
of the valence of the US (e.g., Levey & Martin, 1975), but evaluative contrast effects
(e.g., Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005) can be seen as particular instances of evaluative
learning, as well (see De Houwer et al., 2001; De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005;
Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Martin & Levey, 1978,
for reviews and a meta-analysis on EC).
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1.2.1. History of EC research
Early demonstrations of EC stem from Razran (1940) who paired political slogans
(the CS) with either a free lunch or unpleasant odors (the US). Afterwards, slogans
that were associated with the free lunch were evaluated more positively than those
that were paired with the odors. Also verbal conditioning at which attitudes towards
neutral words (e.g., nonsense words) are being changed by paired them with either
positively or negatively valenced words (C. K. Staats & Staats, 1957; A. W. Staats
& Staats, 1958) can be seen as early evidence of EC (see Jaanus, Defares, & Zwaan,
1990, for a review on verbal conditioning).
A widely used paradigm of modern EC research (the so-called picture-picture
paradigm) has been introduced by Levey and Martin (1975) and elaborated by
Baeyens, Eelen, and Van den Bergh (1990). It consists of a baseline rating phase,
an acquisition phase, and a test rating phase. Based on the baseline ratings, a set
of pictures is sorted into liked, disliked, and neutral pictures. In the subsequent ac-
quisition phase, previously neutral pictures (CSs) are presented together with either
liked, disliked, or other neutral pictures (USs). Subsequent post-ratings of the pic-
tures revealed that the valence of the CSs that were paired with liked or disliked USs
had changed in the direction of the valence of the US (CS-rating differences between
baseline and test phase can be used as a measure of EC). In addition to these verbal
report measures, however, EC effects have also been reported with indirect measures
of evaluative responses, e.g., by means of affective priming (Hermans, Vansteenwe-
gen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2002; Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox, 2007).
Since these early demonstrations of EC, many replications utilizing the picture-
picture paradigm have been reported (e.g., Baeyens, Crombez, Van den Bergh, &
Eelen, 1988; De Houwer, Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 2000; Hammerl & Gra-
bitz, 1993, 1996). Further, EC was shown to occur with haptic (e.g., Hammerl &
Grabitz, 2000; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b), or taste/flavor stimuli (Baeyens, Ee-
len, Van den Bergh, & Crombez, 1990; Dickinson & Brown, 2007; Dwyer, Jarratt, &
Dick, 2007), and there have been demonstrations of cross-modal EC effects (e.g., with
Greek letters and music, or with faces and odors; Eifert, Craill, Carey, & O’Connor,
1988; Todrank, Byrnes, Wrzesniewski, & Rozin, 1995). The auditory modality of
the CS, however, has been neglected in previous studies. In order to extend the
scope of EC, a secondary objective of the study reported in manuscript C (compare
Table 1.1) was to show whether EC effects occur with auditory CSs.
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EC studies have been conducted within various domains of research, including
learning psychology (Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990), social psychology
(e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2001), clinical psychology (e.g., Hermans et al., 2004), neu-
roscience (e.g., Coppens et al., 2006), consumer science (e.g., Allen & Janiszewski,
1989; Stuart, Shimp, & Engle, 1987; Sweldens, 2009), and nutrition research (e.g.,
Bernstein & Webster, 1980). Furthermore, applications of EC can be found in several
domains, as well. Classical conditioning of attitudes towards brands and products
has become a unique field of research in advertising and consumer science (Till &
Priluck, 2000). Shimp, Stuart, and Engle (1991), for instance, have shown that atti-
tudes towards unknown and moderately known brands can be changed by means of
conditioning if the participants are aware of the relationship between the brands and
the USs. EC has also been applied to clinical psychology, particularly with respect
to depression and phobias. In an evaluative counterconditioning procedure, Eifert et
al. (1988) showed that fear reactions towards spiders or snakes can by reduced by
presenting the aversive stimuli together with pleasant stimuli, i.e. music.
It is surprising, however, that applications of EC to advertising and clinical psy-
chology often do not make a distinction between EC and classical conditioning
(Walther, Nagengast, & Trasselli, 2005). Although EC and other forms of Pavlo-
vian conditioning have a lot in common on a procedural level, there appear to be
differences on the process level (see De Houwer et al., 2001). Functional discrepancies
between EC and Pavlovian conditioning have been reported particularly with regard
to the effects of CS-US contingency, extinction trials (CS only trials after condition-
ing), and contingency awareness on the occurrence of conditioned responses. Some
of these findings implying that EC is a distinct form of Pavlovian conditioning are
described next.
1.2.2. Functional characteristics of EC
In Pavlovian conditioning, it has been shown that contiguous CS-US pairings do not
produce a conditioned response if the CS does not hold any predictive information
about the occurrence of the US (Rescorla, 1968). More precisely, conditioning only
occurs if the conditional probability of the US in the presence of the CS differs from
the conditional probability of the US in the absence of the CS (the difference between
these probabilities is a common measure of contingency, see Allan, 1980). Similarly,
post-conditioning presentations of the CS in the absence of the US (CS-only) will
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gradually eliminate the CS’s ability to elicit a conditioned response (extinction, e.g.,
Hamm & Vaitl, 1996; Hugdahl & O¨hman, 1977). Since extinction trials reduce the
CS-US contingency, the occurrence of this phenomenon also implies that Pavlovian
conditioning is susceptible to contingency. EC, however, has been shown to occur
at various levels of and even in the absence of statistical contingency (Baeyens,
Hermans, & Eelen, 1993), and the presentation of CS-only trials after conditioning
were repeatedly shown to not affect the acquired evaluative responses (Baeyens et
al., 1988; Dı´az, Ruiz, & Baeyens, 2005; Dwyer et al., 2007).
Many researchers thus concluded that EC is resistant to extinction and does
not rely on statistical CS-US contingency (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Crombez, 1995;
De Houwer et al., 2000). A dissociation between EC and Pavlovian conditioning
with respect to contingency and extinction is important also with regard to practi-
cal applications. Based on the observation that patients sometimes do not benefit
from an exposure therapy (which is based on extinction), Rachman (1985) proposed
that EC might be involved in the genesis of anxiety disorders. Though the condi-
tioned physiological reactions disappear after an exposure therapy (due to classical
conditioning), the patient’s experienced emotions with respect to the phobic stimuli
might persist due to the resistance to extinction in EC. Indeed, a recent conditioning
experiment with pictures (CSs) and electric shocks (USs) has shown that though the
conditioned physiological reactions decreased, the acquired evaluative reactions did
not change after a couple of extinction trials (Vansteenwegen, Francken, Vervliet,
De Clercq, & Eelen, 2006).
There is another debate on whether EC - like Pavlovian conditioning - is affected
by cue competition which refers to the phenomenon that the acquisition of a condi-
tioned response is influenced by the presence of other stimuli being associated with
the US. Pairing two stimuli A and B with a US, for instance, results in a reduced
conditioned response towards B when A had been paired with the same US by it-
self before (blocking; Kamin, 1968, 1969). In contrast to Pavlovian conditioning, EC
seems to be insensitive to blocking (Beckers, De Viqo, & Baeyens, 2009; Dwyer et
al., 2007; Lipp, Neumann, & Mason, 2001, but see Purkis & Lipp, in press).
One of the biggest controversies in EC research, however, concerns the role of
contingency awareness and attentional resources. This issue is addressed in the next
section.
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1.3. The contingency-awareness issue
1.3.1. Contingency awareness and Pavlovian conditioning
Early behaviorist conceptions of associative learning assumed Pavlovian condition-
ing to result from unconscious, automatic association-formation processes (e.g.,
Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1913). However, there are three types of empirical evi-
dence casting doubt on this assumption. First, many studies have shown that au-
tonomic conditioning only occurs in subjects who are aware of the contingencies
between CSs and USs, whether the autonomic measure is skin conductance (e.g.,
Hamm & Vaitl, 1996; Marinkovic, Schell, & Dawson, 1989), heart rate (Hamm &
Vaitl, 1996), or the modulation of the startle blink reflex to loud auditory stim-
uli (Purkis & Lipp, 2001). Second, it has been found that conditioned responses
do not start to appear until a subject is able to report the CS-US contingencies
(Purkis & Lipp, 2001). Lovibond (1992) has shown that the level of skin conduc-
tance and US expectancy are highly correlated (r = .44) across conditioning trials
within subjects who were classified as contingency-aware (again, unaware subjects
did not show conditioning). Third, having the subjects’ attention diverted by addi-
tional distraction tasks being applied during conditioning has been shown to reduce
both contingency awareness and the extent of conditioned electro-dermal responses
(Dawson, 1970; Dawson & Biferno, 1973). Several reviews of Pavlovian conditioning
thus came to the conclusion that conditioned responses are closely associated with
explicit contingency knowledge or US expectancies, and that there is no condition-
ing in the absence of contingency awareness (Brewer, 1974; Davey, 1987; Dawson
& Schell, 1985, 1987; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond,
2009; O¨hman, 1979). Furthermore, Pavlovian conditioning is supposed not to occur
before the subject has reached contingency awareness. Some authors even inferred
that contingency awareness is necessary (Dawson & Furedy, 1976) or even necessary
and sufficient for autonomic conditioning to occur (Brewer, 1974).
In line with these findings, well-established theories of associative learning (e.g.,
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) propose controlled processes (i.e. US expectancy, con-
tingency awareness) to be involved in the formation of an associative connection
between the representation of CS and the representation of the US which allow the
organism to make predictions about significant events in the environment (i.e. the
appearance of the US). Furthermore, many theories of associative learning (e.g.,
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Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980)1, assume conditioning to be sensitive to the
availability of attentional resources which can be seen as a prerequisite of contin-
gency awareness.
There are only a few - and controversially discussed - studies showing Pavlovian
conditioning of fear-relevant stimuli in the in the absence of US expectancy or after
it has disappeared due to extinction procedures (Hugdahl & O¨hman, 1977; Schell,
Dawson, & Marinkovic, 1991; Dawson, Schell, & Banis, 1986). These findings some-
how support the assumption that particular associations involving fear-relevant CSs
and biologically significant aversive outcomes are formed by rather primitive condi-
tioning processes that do not require awareness (Seligman, 1971). Nevertheless, due
to the many failures in producing learning or memory effects with subliminally pre-
sented stimuli, it would be premature to conclude that learning occurs if participants
are unaware at the time of exposure (Shanks & St. John, 1994).
In the end, Mitchell et al. (2009) identified two learning paradigms that provide
some evidence for unaware conditioning: (a) Perruchet’s paradigm yielding a disso-
ciation between US expectancy and conditioning, and (b) a couple of EC studies
(these will be mentioned in the next section). By comparing the responses after
successive conditioning trials (CS-US) with those after successive CS-only trials,
Perruchet (1985) found the conditioned eye-blink responses to decrease with an
increase of the participants’ US expectancy. Whereas the conditioned eye-blink re-
sponses were most likely after a run of CS-US trials and decreased with the number
of non-reinforced trials occurring, the expectancy ratings were subject to the gam-
bler’s fallacy. That is, the participants expected a US to occur particularly after
a run of CS-only trials but not after a run of CS-US trials (see Clark & Squire,
1998; Clark, Manns, & Squire, 2001; Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006,
for replications). Since recent CS-US trials reduced the participants’ US expectancy
but increased the associative strength, these studies suggest a dissociation between
conditioning and awareness.
The rather controversial data on the relation between of contingency awareness
and EC will be considered in the next section.
1These learning models differ basically with respect to the assumed mechanism determining
whether a stimulus receives attention or not. Whereas Mackintosh (1975) suggested that a
stimulus receives attention when it occurs contingently with a relevant outcome (the US), the
Pearce-Hall theory (Pearce & Hall, 1980) assumes that attention will be paid primarily to stim-
uli with a low associative strength rather than to stimuli that accurately predict the outcome,
already.
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1.3.2. The controversy about the role of contingency
awareness in EC
In early verbal conditioning studies (C. K. Staats & Staats, 1957) and in Levey
and Martin’s (1975) paradigmatic study on EC, changes in the liking of words or
postcards, respectively, were found in subjects who were unable to recall the CS-
US contingencies. Similarly, more recent results imply that contingency awareness
and EC are unrelated (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Baeyens et
al., 1993; Gast & Rothermund, 2011; Olson & Fazio, 2001), and EC effects have
been reported occasionally even in the absence of contingency awareness or when it
had been reduced experimentally (Dickinson & Brown, 2007; Fulcher & Hammerl,
2001b; Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005; Walther & Nagengast,
2006). Fulcher and Hammerl (2001b), for instance, found EC to occur only when
the participants’ degree of contingency awareness has been reduced by means of a
distractor task that diverted attention during conditioning (see Walther, 2002, for a
related finding). Particularly, studies showing EC with subliminally presented USs
provide a strong argument for the existence of unaware EC because it is extremely
unlikely that subjects acquired awareness of the CS-US contingency (De Houwer,
Baeyens, & Eelen, 1994; De Houwer, Baeyens, & Hendrickx, 1997; Field & Moore,
2005; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b). By contrast, however, other studies have shown
that EC like other forms of conditioning depends on the availability of attentional
resources (Field & Moore, 2005; Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Luminet, 2009) and
on the acquisition of contingency awareness (e.g., Dawson et al., 2007; Pleyers,
Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Purkis & Lipp, 2001; Stahl & Unkelbach,
2009; Stahl, Unkelbach, & Corneille, 2009). In these studies, EC effects were found
only in participants who were classified as being aware of the CS-US contingencies
and only for those pairings that a participant was aware of (Pleyers et al., 2007).
Taken together, there are several studies reporting evaluative learning in the ab-
sence of contingency awareness (see De Houwer et al., 2001, for a review), and EC has
been identified to be a conditioning procedure that has produced some of the most
promising evidence for unaware associative learning (Mitchell et al., 2009). How-
ever, while reliable EC effects have been identified in unaware participants as well,
a recent meta-analysis on EC reported larger conditioning effects for contingency-
aware subjects and for those CS-US pairings that were memorized (Hofmann et al.,
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2010). Due to this inconsistency of results, the contingency-awareness issue has been
referred to as the most important unsolved question in EC research (Walther & Na-
gengast, 2006). Particularly the question of whether contingency awareness plays a
causal role in the acquisition of EC remains unsolved (see De Houwer, 2001; Field,
2000, 2001; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al.,
2009, for further discussions).
Many studies of EC have been criticized for their methodological shortcomings
(see Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Shanks & St. John, 1994, for critical reviews on the
sensitivity of awareness measures). In EC research (which practically is restricted
to human subjects), contingency awareness is typically referred to as the partici-
pants’ knowledge that a specific CS has been paired with a specific US and it is
often operationalized as the participant’s ability to recall the CS-US relationship
after conditioning (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990)2. The level of con-
tingency awareness can be measured by means of a post-conditioning recognition
test developed by Baeyens, Eelen, and Van den Bergh (1990). Within this proce-
dure, subjects have to tell the experimenter which stimuli had been paired with
each other (e.g., by selecting a particular associate stimulus for each CS out of two
to six probe stimuli; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b; Walther & Nagengast, 2006). In
many studies, it was not necessary to recall a particular stimulus, but the subject
was classified as aware of a CS-US contingency if he or she was able to recall either
the respective US or another stimulus of the same valence as the US (e.g., Hammerl
& Grabitz, 2000; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005). These rather ‘weak’ criteria of contin-
gency awareness (Davey, 1994b) have the advantage to minimize the probability of
false unaware classifications and should thus be used particularly when testing the
hypothesis that EC does not rely on contingency awareness. Nevertheless, a poten-
tial weakness of post-conditioning awareness measures lies in the temporal distance
between encoding and recall of the stimulus pairings. The subjects might have been
aware of the contingencies during the acquisition phase but have forgotten them
until the test phase. Therefore, it seemed important to integrate the measurement
of awareness into the acquisition phase. By comparing post-conditioning recognition
2In Pavlovian conditioning terminology contingency awareness is often separated from US ex-
pectancy. Whereas the first term refers to the knowledge that a particular CS predicts a partic-
ular US, the second refers to the awareness of immediate US delivery. According to Lovibond
and Shanks (2002), participants are considered aware of the contingencies when they expect a
particular US and when they also know why.
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tests with trial-by-trial US expectancy ratings during the acquisition phase, it was
shown that both measures basically produce the same results with respect to the
role of contingency awareness in EC (Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Purkis
& Lipp, 2001). The overall awareness on a post-conditioning recognition test, how-
ever, increased (from 18% to 77%) when subjects had to give concurrent estimates
of awareness during the learning phase (Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990),
showing that concurrent measurement have a serious impact on the acquisition of
contingency awareness.
Lovibond and Shanks (2002) argue that the inability to recognize a CS-US pairing
(as done by O¨hman & Soares, 1993, for instance) does not mean that the partici-
pant is unaware of the contingencies. Instead they propose a less stringent test of
awareness: Instead of identifying individual stimuli, participants should only have to
discriminate between categories of stimuli (CS+/CS- or masked/non-masked stim-
uli) at a level above chance (but see Wiens & O¨hman, 2002). Further, it has been
argued that contingency awareness may be underestimated in many studies because
awareness scores were aggregated across participants. Indeed, re-analyses suggest
that conditioning effects observed in subjects who were classified as unaware due to
their overall awareness score might be based on a subset of those few CS-US pair-
ings they were aware of (e.g., Wardle, Mitchell, & Lovibond, 2007). In line with this,
contingency awareness has been analyzed (or manipulated) on the level of CS-US
pairings rather than on the level of participants in all the studies reported in this
dissertation.
Other researchers proposed to distinguish between different types of CS-US contin-
gency awareness. Stahl and Unkelbach (2009) and Stahl et al. (2009), demonstrated
EC in participants who are unable to recall the identity of the USs that had been
paired with particular CSs, if they are able to recall the valence of the respective
USs. Furthermore, EC was shown to occur after a CS had been paired with a single
US as well as when it had been paired with several USs of the same valence (Olson
& Fazio, 2001; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009). These results imply that awareness of US
valence rather than awareness of US identity is crucial for the acquisition of EC.
The particular role of valence awareness has been studied in manuscript A, as well.
Due to those empirical findings that suggest a dissociation between EC and other
form of associative learning with respect the above mentioned variables, EC was
considered to be a unique form of learning. Different theoretical accounts of EC are
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outlined in the next section.
1.4. Accounts of evaluative conditioning
Based on early demonstrations of EC (Razran, 1954; C. K. Staats & Staats, 1957;
A. W. Staats & Staats, 1958), the same processes as in Pavlovian conditioning
were assumed to lead to affective-evaluative transfers from the US to the CS. EC
was considered to be an attitudinal version of classical conditioning that applies to
affective-evaluative responses rather than to physiological or motor responses.
Due to the functional discrepancies between EC and other forms of associative
learning concerning the roles of contingency, cue competition and particularly con-
tingency awareness (e.g., Baeyens et al., 1988; Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh,
1990; Baeyens et al., 1993), it has been suggested that EC is a unique form of con-
ditioning distinct from Pavlovian signal learning. Several alternative models have
been proposed since to account for the acquisition of EC. The most important ones
are introduced briefly in the following.
1.4.1. The holistic account
According to the holistic account of EC, the paired presentations of CS and US
are supposed to automatically change the perception of the CS, i.e. it becomes more
similar to the US. In the end, a holistic representation is formed containing elements
of the CS as well as elements of the US including the valence of the US (Martin &
Levey, 1978, 1994; Levey & Martin, 1975). Subsequent CS presentations are assumed
to activate the whole representation, and thus automatically retrieve the evaluative
response towards the US. In other words, the CS is thought to bring out its own
reinforcement’ (Martin & Levey, 1994, p. 301)
Contiguous co-occurrences of the CS and the US are supposed to be sufficient for
EC to occur and awareness of these stimulus pairings should not be necessary. The
account is in line with results showing that EC is resistant to extinction (Baeyens
et al., 1988; Vansteenwegen et al., 2006), and not sensitive to statistical contingency
(Baeyens et al., 1993). However, since holistic CS-US representations are formed
only if both the CS and the US are presented together, the holistic account is not
able to explain the occurrence of sensory preconditioning in EC (that is changes in
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the liking of a CS that was never paired directly with the US but only with another
CS; e.g., Hammerl & Grabitz, 1996).
1.4.2. The referential-learning account
Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, and Van den Bergh (1992) have proposed a dual-process
account of Pavlovian conditioning that distinguishes between learning (a) predictive
and (b) merely referential stimulus relationships. In typical instances of Pavlovian
conditioning an organism is supposed to learn that the CS signalizes the prompt
appearance of the US. The extent of learning is assumed to be a function of how
contingently the CS-US pairings occur (e.g., Rescorla, 1988). Thus conditioning is
assumed to depend not only on the number of CS-US pairings (i.e. contiguity), but on
the statistical contingency between CS and US which also depends on the number
of times the CS or the US is presented alone. Eventually, the organism expects
the emergence of the US whenever the CS occurs. Thus, learning is supposed to
depend on a certain degree of awareness concerning the CS-US relationship which
is necessary to anticipate the US (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002).
By contrast, referential learning is considered as a more basic form of learning
that follows a simple Hebbian learning rule only requiring parameters of contiguity
and stimulus salience. The strength of the CS-US association increases whenever the
stimuli co-occur, but it remains unchanged when a CS or a US is presented in iso-
lation. After conditioning, the CS is supposed to activate the mental representation
of the US without generating an expectation of the US to occur. Thus, referential
learning is assumed to occur automatically and independently of awareness. This
type of learning has been suggested to underly EC (Baeyens et al., 1992; Baeyens,
Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Eelen, 2001). The referential learning account can ex-
plain the observed resistance to extinction in EC (Baeyens et al., 1988; Dwyer et
al., 2007), and it also predicts EC to be insensitive to contingency (Baeyens et al.,
1993) and to blocking (Beckers et al., 2009). Furthermore, since referential learning
is assumed to be an automatic process, the account is in line with demonstrations of
EC in the absence of contingency awareness (e.g., Dickinson & Brown, 2007; Fulcher
& Hammerl, 2001b; Walther & Nagengast, 2006).
1.4 Accounts of evaluative conditioning 32
1.4.3. The concept categorization account
Davey (1994a) suggested that EC is not based on the formation of associations
between memory representations but on conceptual learning (compare also Field
& Davey, 1999). Features that a CS has in common with the US are supposed to
become more salient during the presentations of the CS-US pairings. This is assumed
to increase the probability to categorize the CS as a stimulus of the same valence
as the US. Basically, EC effects are accounted by a priming mechanism wherein
the US serves as a prime directing attention to congruent features of the CS. The
magnitude of EC should depend mainly on the number of co-occurrences and the
number of features shared by the CS and the US (Davey, 1994a). Since the salience
of CS features can change only when both the CS and the US are presented, neither
single presentations of the CS (extinction) nor variations in statistical contingency
should affect the valence of the CS. Further, EC effects are expected to be larger
when the CS is highly similar to the US. EC should thus be impaired if CS and US
belong to different stimulus modalities.
1.4.4. The implicit misattribution account
The recently proposed implicit misattribution account refers to EC as a source-
confusion error by which the valence of the US is falsely attributed to features of
the CS (Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009; Jones, Olson, & Fazio, 2010). That is, contigu-
ous CS-US presentations make the participant believe that the liking or disliking is
caused by the CS rather than by the US. These misattributions of valence are sup-
posed to be driven by automatic attitude activations (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell,
& Kardes, 1986), and they should occur implicitly. Any variable that makes it more
likely to misattribute the valence of the US to the CS should thus increase the EC
effect. Since source confusion errors should be more likely if CS and US are similar,
EC is expected to be stronger if CS and US match in modality and if their valences
are similar. Further, awareness is expected to counteract with misattributions. EC
should thus be more likely when the participants are unaware of the CS-US contin-
gencies. Indeed, Jones et al. (2009) found EC to increase with a number of these
variable like the salience of the CS or the spatial proximity between the CS and the
US.
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1.4.5. The propositional account
The propositional account of associative learning (e.g., De Houwer, 2007, 2009;
Mitchell et al., 2009) refers to conditioning effects - whether Pavlovian or evaluative
- as the result of the formation and evaluation of propositions about events rather
than on the formation of simple associative links between representations. Whereas
associative links simply refer to the strength of the relation between two representa-
tions, propositional links hold a quality of the relation between the representations.
Such a quality can be the causal relation between two events A and B (e.g., the
statement ‘A causes B’) and it can differ in the degree to which it is assumed to be
correct. Conditioning is expected to occur to the extent that particular propositions
about the CS and the US are considered by the subject to be true. The formation
of propositions is assumed to rely on non-automatic processes requiring direct (con-
scious) experience of the CS-US pairings. Therefore, prior knowledge, instructions or
deductive reasoning, for instances, are expected to modulate the conditioning effect.
A crucial difference between propositional and associative models lies in the as-
sumed role of consciousness - and particularly contingency awareness - in learning.
The propositional account predicts contingency awareness to be a crucial factor in
the acquisition of EC, because it is thought to be necessary for the truth-evaluation
of the propositional link which, in turn, is assumed to be necessary for conditioning
to occur. Thus, it is rather difficult for this account to explain the occurrence of EC
in the absence of contingency awareness (e.g., Dickinson & Brown, 2007; Fulcher &
Hammerl, 2001b).
1.5. Research questions
1.5.1. Theoretical framework
The accounts of EC can be categorized with respect to whether they focus on (a) the
automatic formation of associations in memory between representations of the CS
and the US (i.e. the holistic, the referential, and the implicit misattribution account)
or on (b) the impact of higher-order processes such as conceptual categorization
or the formation of propositions (see Hofmann et al., 2010). Probably the most
prominent outcome of higher-order propositional processes in associative learning is
contingency awareness.
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With regard to the assumed causal relationship between contingency awareness
and conditioning, Lovibond and Shanks (2002) proposed to distinguish between
three classes of models. ‘Strict’ single-process models assume a single propositional
learning process: Exposure to a CS-US contingency in the environment is assumed
to enhance contingency awareness (through propositional learning) which in turn
is thought to initiate the conditioned response (see Figure 1.1 A1). According to
the propositional account, for instance, EC is supposed to result from conscious
propositional knowledge about the CS-US relationship which might serve as a justi-
fication for (dis)liking an ambiguously valenced CS (De Houwer et al., 2005). ‘Weak’
single-process models (Figure 1.1 A2) assume that both contingency awareness and
the conditioned response are elicited by the same (propositional) learning process. In
contrast to the ‘strict’ version, however, these models do not assume a causal relation
between contingency awareness and conditioning. Thus, they can also explain con-
ditioned responses to be acquired independently of contingency awareness (Baeyens,
Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990). By contrast, dual-process models (Figure 1.1 B) pre-
sume two independent learning systems, one that initiates the conditioned response
by automatically forming associations between stimulus representations (e.g., the
referential learning system; Baeyens et al., 1992), and another one that is respon-
sible for the acquisition of propositional knowledge and awareness (the expectancy
learning system). Dual-process models thus do not assume a causal role of contin-
gency awareness in the production of a conditioned response.
Contingency awareness can thus be seen as an outcome of particular propositional-
learning processes which might operate, for instance, during the exposure to the
CS-US pairings. In order to study the role of propositional learning in EC, it is nec-
essary to define and investigate those cognitive resources that are required during
conditioning to enable propositional learning. The studies reported in this disser-
tation focus particularly on those propositional-learning processes that concern the
CS-US contingency information, because these factors are expected to be crucial for
the formation of contingency awareness.
Since contingency awareness is typically operationalized by means of a delayed
contingency recognition tests (compare section 1.2), it certainly requires the CS-
US contingency information to be stored in memory. Thus, successful propositional
learning about the CS-US contingency is supposed to be a function of those cognitive
factors that have an impact on memory performance. It should be crucial (a) to pay
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B)
Exposure to
CS-US pairs
propositional
learning
associative
processes
contingency
awareness
conditioning
A1)
Exposure to
CS-US pairs
propositional
learning
contingency
awareness
conditioning
A2)
Exposure to
CS-US pairs
propositional
learning
contingency
awareness
conditioning
Figure 1.1.: Schematic illustration of ‘strict’ and ‘weak’ forms of single-process mod-
els (A1 and A2), and dual-process models (B), according to Lovibond
& Shanks (2002).
attention to the CS-US contingency information and (b) to retain this information
in working memory during the acquisition of EC.
Once, the participant has acquired knowledge about the CS-US pairings (con-
tingency memory), higher-order thinking and reasoning may further modulate the
content of the propositional knowledge and help to form sophisticated knowledge
about the CS-US relationship. For instance, a participant may acquire knowledge
about the statistical contingency between the CS and the US.
The assumed relations between each propositional-learning process (i.e. attention,
working memory, long-term memory, and propositional knowledge) and the acquisi-
tion of (a) measures of contingency knowledge and (b) EC are illustrated schemati-
cally in Figure 1.2. The next section sketches out which aspect of the problem each
of the manuscripts addresses.
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1.5.2. Relations between the manuscripts
The doctoral dissertation focuses on the relationship between EC and those pro-
cesses that are supposed to be crucial in propositional learning about the CS-US
contingencies. New experimental paradigms have been developed in order to manip-
ulate and measure these cognitive factors during the acquisition of EC. The thesis
comprises three original manuscripts each reporting one or several experiments on
the effect of a particular propositional-learning process (independent variable) on
the acquisition of both EC and contingency awareness (see Table 1.1).
Each factor is expected to affect propositional learning during the exposure to
CS-US pairings in a particular manner (compare Figure 1.5.1). In a first step,
propositional learning is assumed to require attention being focused on the stim-
uli (i.e. the CS and the US). However, in order to acquire contingency knowledge,
it might be crucial to particularly focus attention on the contingency between the
CS and the US, as well (see Figure 1.2). Second, representations of these CS-US
associations may be built and stored in working memory, and eventually result in
long-term contingency memory. Contingency awareness typically refers to this kind
of long-term memory since it is quantified as the performance in a post-conditioning
recognition test (e.g., Walther & Nagengast, 2006, see Figure 1.2). Finally, after
having acquired knowledge about the CS-US contingency, a participant may gain
more elaborated propositional knowledge about the strength of the statistical con-
tingency (i.e. whether the CS reliably predicts the occurrence of the US). This type
of propositional knowledge is measured typically by means of contingency judgments
(see Figure 1.2).
Thus, propositional learning about the CS-US contingencies is assumed to involve
three important cognitive factors: (a) the focus of attention, (b) working memory
capacity, and (c) propositional knowledge about CS-US contingencies. The acqui-
sition of contingency awareness is expected to require both a focus of attention on
the CS-US contingency as well as working memory resources to be available dur-
ing conditioning. Thus, according to single-process models, these two factors should
also determine the occurrence and/or the magnitude of the EC effect. By contrast,
dual-process models would expect EC to occur even without attention or working
memory resources to be available during the acquisition. The impact of these cog-
nitive resources on the occurrence of EC was investigated in manuscripts A and
B. In an experiment reported in manuscript A, the selective focus of attention was
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manipulated between groups by means of specifically demanding secondary tasks
during conditioning. The effect of working memory capacity during conditioning
was investigated in a series of experiments reported in manuscript B. Therefore,
working memory capacity was limited experimentally by inducing different degrees
of phonological-loop disruption during EC with verbal CSs and USs.
After having memorized the CS-US pairings, a participant may acquire elaborated
propositional knowledge about the co-occurrences of the CS and the US. The propo-
sitional account of EC (e.g., De Houwer, 2009) might expect these propositions to
determine the magnitude of the EC effects. Other accounts, however, would rather
expect objective variables like the CS-US contingency to have an impact on the
occurrence of conditioned responses. The influence of both objective CS-US contin-
gency and elaborated propositional knowledge about the CS-US contingency on EC
is addressed in manuscript C. In this manuscript, an experiment is reported that
investigated the impact of experimentally modulated contingency judgments on the
effect size of EC in participants who are clearly aware of the contingencies.
Taken together, the studies reported in this dissertation focus on the following
main research questions:
• Does EC depend on the acquisition of explicit knowledge about the CS-US
pairings (manuscripts A, B, and C)?
• Does the occurrence of EC rely on particular focus of attention on the contin-
gencies (manuscript A) and working memory resources to be available during
the acquisition (manuscript B)?
• Is the magnitude of EC a function of (a) objective CS-US contingency or (b)
propositional knowledge about the strength of the CS-US contingency, or both
(manuscript C)?
A summary of the each manuscript is given in the following chapter.
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2. Outline of the thesis
2.1. Manuscript A - “Revisiting the relation between
contingency awareness and attention:
Evaluative conditioning relies on a
contingency focus”
2.1.1. Purpose of the study
The results of previous studies suggest, that attentional resources play a crucial
role in the acquisition of EC (Field & Moore, 2005; Pleyers et al., 2009). Based on
their results, Field and Moore (2005), argue that attention rather than contingency
awareness is critical for the acquisition of EC. In their study, contingency awareness
was manipulated by means of subliminal presentations of the USs (17 ms exposure
and backward masking) whereas attention was manipulated by having the subjects
engage in a distraction task (counting backwards). In principle, during the exposure
to CS-US pairings, attention can either be focused on (or diverted from) either the
stimuli themselves or the contingency between the stimuli. Field and Moore (2005),
however, did not distinguish between attention being paid to stimuli (the CS and
the US) and attention being paid to the CS-US contingency. Though attention can
be focused on the contingency only if it has been assigned to the respective stimuli,
it should be possible to assign attention to the stimuli while not monitoring their
contingency. A contingency focus of attention, however, is assumed to be crucial in
order to acquire contingency awareness. The role of attending to CS-US contingen-
cies during conditioning was investigated in the experiment reported in manuscript
A. Particularly, the manuscript is concerned with the question of whether (a) at-
tention in terms of a stimulus focus is sufficient for EC to occur or whether (b) EC
2.1 Manuscript A - “Revisiting the relation between contingency
awareness and attention: Evaluative conditioning relies on a contingency
focus” 41
requires focusing on the contingencies.
2.1.2. Method
Therefore, a method was developed to specifically prevent subjects from paying at-
tention to the contingencies while still paying attention to the stimuli (contingency-
distraction group). Participants in two additional experimental groups were either
engaged in a general distraction task (full-distraction group) that is expected to
divert attention from the stimuli (solving arithmetic problems, cf. Field & Moore,
2005; Pleyers et al., 2009; Walther, 2002), or in a contingency-focus inducing task
(attention-enhanced group) requiring them to memorize the CS-US contingencies
(Field & Moore, 2005; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b). In order to learn the contin-
gencies, these participants are assumed to have attended both to the stimuli and
to their contingencies during conditioning1. In line with previous findings, subjects
in the attention-enhanced group are expected to show EC after having acquired
knowledge about the CS-US contingencies (e.g., Dawson et al., 2007; Pleyers et al.,
2007; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009). However, if attention to the stimuli is sufficient for
EC to occur (Field & Moore, 2005), then conditioning effects would be expected
to occur in the contingency distraction group as well, because these participants
focused their attention to the CS and the US. By contrast, if contingency awareness
is crucial for the acquisition of EC (Pleyers et al., 2009), then conditioning should
depend on attention being paid to the contingencies. Thus, EC should be diminished
in the contingency-distraction group. In any case, EC is not expected to occur in the
full-distraction group due to the lack of attention being paid to the stimuli (Field
& Moore, 2005).
A total of 109 students were assigned randomly to one of the three experimental
groups. They participated in an EC experiment using individually pre-rated visual
stimuli (advertisement pictures) as CSs and USs. Pre-post differences of the eval-
uative ratings of CSs and post-conditioning contingency recognition (contingency
awareness) were measured for each CS-US pairing.
1In order to show a dissociation between attention and contingency awareness (compare Field
& Moore, 2005), it would also be nice to implement an additional condition (i.e. a task) that
induces contingency awareness while diverting attention from the stimuli. However, it might be
disputed whether it is theoretically and/or empirically possible to acquire contingency awareness
without paying attention to the stimuli.
2.2 Manuscript B - “Irrelevant speech prevents learning: On the
importance of working memory for evaluative conditioning” 42
2.1.3. Results and Discussion
As expected, a significant effect of EC was found only in subjects who focused
their attention to the CS-US contingencies in order to memorize them (attention-
enhanced group) but not if attention was diverted by means of a secondary task.
Interestingly, not only the general distraction task but also the specific contingency-
distraction task urging the participants to attend to the stimuli eliminated the EC
effect. This shows that attention being paid to the stimuli is not sufficient for EC
to occur. Rather, a contingency focus seems to be crucial during conditioning. Not
surprisingly, participants in the attention-enhanced group memorized the CS-US
contingencies better than participants in the two distraction groups did, indicating
a greater degree of contingency awareness.
The results of manuscript A are in conflict with two assumptions that have been
raised in the literature: (a) that attention (being paid to the stimuli) rather than
contingency awareness is critical for EC to occur (Field & Moore, 2005) and (b)
that there is a dissociation between EC and contingency awareness (e.g., Fulcher &
Hammerl, 2001b). Assuming that a contingency focus is critical for the acquisition of
contingency awareness, the observed inhibition of EC with contingency distraction
strongly suggest that contingency awareness plays a crucial role in the acquisition
of EC (Pleyers et al., 2009). This conclusion is further supported by the results
of a mediation analysis implying that the differential effect of the secondary-task
manipulation on EC is driven by the level of contingency awareness. To sum up,
the results imply that contingency awareness at the time of the acquisition (i.e. a
contingency focus) rather than attention in terms of a stimulus focus is crucial for
EC to occur.
2.2. Manuscript B - “Irrelevant speech prevents
learning: On the importance of working
memory for evaluative conditioning”
2.2.1. Purpose of the study
Propositional accounts assume that EC relies on the formation and evaluation of
propositional knowledge about the CS-US relationship (e.g., De Houwer, 2009). Since
2.2 Manuscript B - “Irrelevant speech prevents learning: On the
importance of working memory for evaluative conditioning” 43
contingency awareness is typically measured by means of a delayed recognition test
after conditioning, any factor that influences the encoding of CS-US pairs in long-
term memory is expected to also have an effect on the acquisition of contingency
awareness. The probability to store the CS-US contingency information in long-term
memory will be greater, for instance, the more it has been rehearsed in working
memory during conditioning (Baddeley, 1986). In line with this, occupying the sub-
ject’s working memory, e.g., by means of a tracking task, has been shown to reduce
EC (Brunstorm & Higgs, 2002, but see Johnsrude, Owen, Zhao, & White, 1999).
Working memory capacity during conditioning is thus supposed to be an important
resource of propositional learning and it should have an impact on the acquisition of
contingency awareness and - according to the propositional account - on EC. More
precisely, the formation of contingency memory is assumed to require stimuli being
actively retained in working memory. Representations of the CS and the US (and
their contingency) are expected to occupy working memory during the acquisition
of EC (e.g., the phonological loop in case of phonological or verbal stimuli, compare
Baddeley, 1996, 2003). Consequently, if the acquisition of propositional contingency
knowledge is crucial, then EC should be less likely if working memory capacity is
constrained during conditioning. In manuscript B, three experiments are reported
that assessed the impact of working memory by producing phonological disruption
during the acquisition. Therefore, a method was developed to occupy the phonolog-
ical loop with irrelevant sound differing with respect to how speech-like it is, in a
EC procedure with verbal CSs and USs.
2.2.2. Method
A total of 109 subjects participated in one of three EC experiments. Individually pre-
rated neutral non-words were used as CSs in all experiments. Standardized affective
German nouns (from the Berlin Affective Word List; Vo, Jacobs, & Conrad, 2006)
were used as USs in experiment 1. Individually pre-rated liked and disliked non-
words were used as USs in experiments 2 and 3. Pre-post differences of the evaluative
CS-ratings and contingency memory were measured for each CS-US pairing.
Pairs of words and/or non-words had to be encoded under different conditions of
phonological distraction which are expected to produce well-defined degrees of mem-
ory impairment. During conditioning, participants were either articulating irrelevant
numbers or they were listening to irrelevant speech (a segment of a Korean poem
2.2 Manuscript B - “Irrelevant speech prevents learning: On the
importance of working memory for evaluative conditioning” 44
recited by a native speaker adopted by Zimmer, Ghani, & Ellermeier, 2008), or to
less-distracting non-speech sound (e.g., frequency-modulated tones). Control pair-
ings were presented either in silence or while white noise was played back (both are
expected not to disrupt working memory; see Ellermeier & Zimmer, 1997). Thereby,
it was possible to produce graded levels of contingency awareness rather than merely
reducing it in an unspecific way as with typical attentional-distraction tasks (e.g.,
Field & Moore, 2005; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b).
2.2.3. Results and Discussion
The results show that the playback of irrelevant speech during verbal EC impaired
both the memorizing of the CS-US parings and the conditioning effect. Subjects’
CS ratings changed as a function of US valence only if mildly disrupting non-speech
sound was played back but not if irrelevant speech (whether it was produced by
participants or merely passively processed) impaired the encoding of the CS-US
associates. This finding strongly indicates that EC occurs only if the CS-US pair-
ings have been successfully encoded in working memory and it challenges those
theoretical accounts which assume EC to rely on automatic association formation
processes (e.g., Baeyens et al., 1992; Martin & Levey, 1994; Walther & Langer,
2008). However, EC occurred independently of whether the participants were able
to recognize the respective CS-US contingencies in a delayed test of contingency
awareness. This indicated that EC does not necessarily depend on the acquisition
of long-term knowledge about the contingencies. Rather, it seems to be crucial that
the CS-US pairings have been consciously processed (rehearsed) in working memory
during the acquisition phase.
2.3 Manuscript C - “Does evaluative learning rely on the perception of
contingency? Manipulating contingency and US density during
evaluative conditioning” 45
2.3. Manuscript C - “Does evaluative learning rely
on the perception of contingency?
Manipulating contingency and US density
during evaluative conditioning”
2.3.1. Purpose of the study
After having rehearsed the CS-US pairings sufficiently, the participant is assumed
to store the contingencies in long-term memory. There is a great number of studies
(although they are reporting controversial results) in which the subsequent recall
of contingency knowledge has been utilized as a measure of contingency awareness
(e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005; Pleyers et
al., 2009; Stahl et al., 2009; Walther & Nagengast, 2006). Contingency knowledge
thus basically refers to the participant’s ability to identify CS-US pairings (i.e. con-
tiguity), but not to knowledge about the strength of the contingency. According to
propositional accounts of EC, however, it might be possible that more sophisticated
knowledge about the CS-US relationship has an impact on EC. Interestingly, the role
of knowledge about the CS-US contingency (i.e. contingency judgments) has been
neglected so far both in empirical studies and in theoretical accounts of EC. Even
propositional models which assume that evaluative learning relies on the formation
of propositional knowledge concerning the CS-US relationship (e.g., De Houwer,
2007, 2009), did not make any clear predictions on whether propositions about the
strength of the CS-US contingency should affect EC. It has been considered possible,
however, that propositions about the statistical contingency mediate EC (e.g., Hof-
mann et al., 2010, p. 394). Higher contingency judgments may strengthen the belief
that the CS and the US are related and consequently lead to stronger conditioned
responses. However, there are no studies, yet, that experimentally manipulated the
participants’ conscious beliefs about the CS-US relations during EC (Hofmann et
al., 2010). This was the aim of the present experiment. A method was developed
that allows to independently study the impact of objective contingency and sub-
jective contingency judgments on the magnitude of EC. In line with Baeyens et al.
(1993), objective contingency is not expected to affect EC. However, propositions
about a strong CS-US contingency are expected to produce stronger EC effects than
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propositions about a weak CS-US contingency. Further, in order to extend the scope
of EC, it was intended to demonstrate EC within a new sensory modality of the CSs
(i.e. auditory stimuli).
2.3.2. Method
In manuscript C, an experiment is reported in which participants’ contingency judg-
ments were modulated independently from the objective CS-US contingency by mak-
ing use of the outcome density bias. This bias refers to the phenomenon that the
statistical contingency between a cue and an outcome that occur with constant
contingency is judged to be stronger if the outcome occurs frequently (e.g., Al-
lan & Jenkins, 1983). By combining the EC procedure with a contingency-learning
paradigm, both the CS-US contingency (in terms of ∆P , equation 2.1, cf. Allan,
1980) and US density (P (US)) were varied during the acquisition of EC in order to
modulate the subjective contingency judgments between different CS-US pairings.
∆P = P (US|CS)− P (US|¬CS) (2.1)
A total of 31 subjects participated in an EC experiment with auditory CSs (en-
vironmental sounds) and visual USs (IAPS pictures; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert,
2008). CS-US pairings were presented in two separate learning blocks. Objective
contingency varied between blocks and US density varied within blocks. After each
block, evaluative responses, contingency memory and contingency judgments were
measured for each CS-US pairing.
2.3.3. Results and Discussion
Contingency judgments were higher in the high-contingency block (∆P = .75) than
in the low-contingency block (∆P = .5) and they decreased with an increase of US
density from P (US) = .1 to P (US) = .3. This shows that the participants were
able to notice the objective contingencies (∆P ), but their contingency judgments
were (successfully) biased by US density. The observed effect of outcome density on
contingency judgments is similar to previous results (e.g., Wasserman, Elek, Chat-
losh, & Baker, 1993). Since contingency judgments were not affected by contingency
but only by an interaction between contingency and US density, the outcome den-
sity effect appears to have modulated the subjective beliefs about the contingencies
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independently of the objective values of contingency. The study also revealed an
overall EC effect. Comparable effect sizes of EC were observed with high and low
values of contingency, indicating that EC is not sensitive to the CS-US contingency.
The magnitude of the conditioning effect, however, was affected by an interaction of
contingency and US density, and it was positively correlated with the contingency
judgments. Bigger EC effects were observed in those contingency × US density con-
ditions that produced higher contingency judgments.
The results provide evidence for contingency judgments to have an impact on the
acquisition of EC. The appraisal of a strong CS-US contingency appears to produce
larger EC effects. Thus, while knowledge about the CS-US contiguities (contin-
gency awareness) is assumed to be necessary for the acquisition of EC, propositional
knowledge about the contingencies may modulate the size of the EC effect. This
strongly challenges the assumption that EC relies (only) on automatic processes
(e.g., Baeyens et al., 1992). However, the effect can be explained with the proposi-
tional account of EC (e.g., De Houwer, 2009). The results are in line with the idea
that EC is sensitive to propositions about the CS-US contingency: Strengthening
the subjective belief that CS and US are statistically related enhances EC.
3. General discussion and
conclusions
3.1. Summary of results
The present doctoral thesis consists of three manuscripts that are in press or under
review with refereed journals. They report five experiments studying a total of 249
participants showing that evaluative learning is sensitive to a specific focus of at-
tention, the availability of working-memory resources, and subjective beliefs about
the CS-US contingencies. Each of these factors were shown to modulate the effect
size of EC, that is the standardized repeated-measures difference of the means of
the evaluative rating shifts of CSs that were paired with positive and negative USs
(CSpos and CSneg, respectively; see equation 3.1 and Cohen, 1988). A summary of
the observed effects sizes of EC and the levels of contingency awareness reached in
each experimental condition are shown in Table 3.1.
d =
MCSpos −MCSneg√
SDCSpos
2+SDCSneg
2
2
(3.1)
Manuscript A started by investigating what attention must be focused on before
EC effects occur. The crucial finding of this experiment was that - although attention
may be focused on the CS and the US - there is no EC when participants are not
attending to the CS-US contingency. A medium effect size (Cohen, 1988) of EC was
found only when subjects focused on the contingencies and acquired contingency
awareness (Table 3.1). This implies that attention to the stimuli is not sufficient for
EC to occur. Rather, EC seems to require a more specific focus on the contingencies
between stimuli which is supposed to be crucial also for the acquisition of contingency
awareness.
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Manuscript B sheds light on the role of working memory capacity during EC. Par-
ticularly, the encoding of CS-US pairings (and thus the acquisition of contingency
knowledge) was disrupted by simultaneously presenting irrelevant materials which
are supposed to gain automatic access to the same working memory module (i.e.
the phonological loop). These irrelevant materials consistently (a) produced a grad-
ual decrement in contingency awareness (approximately 10-20%, compare Table 3.1)
and (b) interfered with the acquisition of EC. Medium effect sizes of EC were found
only if the CS-US pairs were presented either in silence or together with (mildly
disrupting) non-speech sounds (except for experiment 1 where a considerable level
of contingency awareness and EC was observed in the irrelevant-speech condition, as
well; see Table 3.1). These result indicate that evaluative learning requires a certain
amount of working-memory resources to be available during conditioning. If work-
ing memory is occupied by different (irrelevant) materials, then EC is less likely to
occur, presumably because the subject is not able to encode the CS-US pairings.
However, additional item-based analyses (compare Pleyers et al., 2007) revealed that
conditioning was not restricted to those pairings that the participants recognized in
a subsequent test. Though working-memory resources are crucial during condition-
ing in order to encode the CS-US contingencies, evaluative learning may thus not
necessarily depend on the acquisition of long-term contingency knowledge.
Manuscript C looked at the appraisal of the contingency relationship between the
CS and the US in greater detail. Here, the perceived CS-US contingency was ma-
nipulated successfully during evaluative learning by taking advantage of a judgment
bias that is caused by US density modulations (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1983). Partic-
ipants were either biased to believe that the CS strongly predicted the US or not,
independently of how strongly the CS objectively predicted the US (in terms of ∆P ,
Allan, 1980). Similar to the results shown by Wasserman et al. (1993), an increase
of US density from 10 to 30% came along with a decrease in the contingency judg-
ments irrespective of whether the objective contingency was high (∆P = .75) or low
(∆P = .5). Considerable effects of EC were found in all experimental conditions,
probably due to the fact that participants were aware of most of the contingencies
(compare Table 3.1). The effect size of EC, however, was affected by an interaction
of contingency and US density, but not by objective contingency alone. Further-
more, the magnitude of EC was positively correlated with the subjective appraisal
of the CS-US contingency. This result implies that evaluative learning is sensitive
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to modulations of the propositional knowledge about the relation between the CS
and the US. Once a participant has successfully memorized the CS-US contiguities
(which should be crucial for the acquisition of EC, compare manuscripts A and
B), the subjective appraisal of the strength of the CS-US contingencies appears to
determine the magnitude of the EC effect.
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3.2. Theoretical significance
The results reported in manuscript A are in line with ‘strict’ single-process mod-
els (e.g., the propositional account; De Houwer, 2007, 2009) assuming contingency
awareness to be necessary for the acquisition of EC: Conditioning was shown to
occur only if the participants specifically focus their attention on the CS-US contin-
gencies during the acquisition. By contrast, the holistic and the referential account
of EC (Martin & Levey, 1978; Baeyens et al., 1992) as well as other automatic
association-formation models (e.g., Walther & Langer, 2008) do not predict EC to
rely on attention being particularly paid to the contingency. Since these models as-
sume EC to be driven by automatic processes, there should be no effect of attentional
distraction at all. Thus, it is hard to explain the results reported in manuscript A
with these models. It is also difficult to explain the observed EC effects by assuming
an implicit misattribution of the US valence to features of the CS being (Jones et al.,
2009), because such misattributions are supposed to be less likely when attention
is focused on the relevant stimuli. By contrast, implicit misattributions should be
more likely to occur with diverted attention.
The experiments reported in manuscript B basically show that EC is sensitive to
working-memory capacity. The acquisition of both contingency awareness and EC
was shown to depend on the availability of working-memory capacity. This is in
line with ‘weak’ and ‘strict’ forms of single-process models (compare Lovibond &
Shanks, 2002) assuming that the exposure to CS-US pairings leads to both contin-
gency awareness and the acquisition of an evaluative response. Fulcher and Ham-
merl (2001a) argue that if there is a causal relation between contingency awareness
and EC (‘strict’ single-process models), then the conditioning effect should increase
when awareness is enhanced and it should decrease when awareness is reduced. Since
distinct levels of contingency awareness were induced experimentally by producing
well-defined working memory disruptions, the results of these experiments are in fa-
vor of the ‘strict’ hypothesis that there is a causal effect of contingency awareness on
EC. However, this conclusion refers contingency awareness to the amount of CS-US
contingency information that is kept in working memory during the acquisition of
EC. Long-term contingency memory (as measured in many previous studies; e.g.,
Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b; Walther &
Nagengast, 2006) might be less relevant. So far, the impact of working-memory re-
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sources on EC has been shown only with verbal stimuli. In order to extend the scope
of this effect, future studies may want to utilize procedures with the CS and the US
being presented in different modalities thus calling for different working memory
modules.
Manuscript C provides further evidence that elaborated propositional knowledge
about the CS-US relation can influence the magnitude of the EC effect. Comparable
effect sizes of EC were found with low and with high levels of objective contingency
(compare Table 3.1). This is consistent with the finding that the CS does not have
to be a predictive cue for the occurrence of the US in EC (Baeyens et al., 1993).
Independently of objective contingency, however, the subjective appraisal of a strong
CS-US contingency was shown to go along with greater EC effects. It is difficult
to explain the results of this study by Pavlovian conditioning theories assuming
that learning should be a function of contingency (e.g., Rescorla, 1968, 1988). The
insensitivity to contingency is more in line with the referential account explaining EC
as a simple form of Hebbian learning in which the CS only activates the US without
generating an expectancy of the US to occur immediately (Baeyens et al., 1992,
2001). According to these and similar accounts (Martin & Levey, 1978; Walther &
Langer, 2008), EC should be primarily determined by the number of CS-US pairings.
This assumption, in turn, is challenged by the finding that EC was modulated by an
interplay of contingency and US density. The participants’ subjective appraisal of the
CS-US contingencies was affected by an interaction of contingency and US density,
as well. Furthermore, since EC was correlated with these subjective contingency
judgments, the pattern of results reported in manuscript C is accounted best by
assuming that propositions about the predictive relationship between the CS and the
US foster the evaluation acquired. Thus, the finding is particularly relevant for the
propositional account assuming EC to result from cognitively evaluated propositions
about the relation between the CS and the US (De Houwer, 2007). The appraisal of
a strong CS-US contingency could have fostered the propositional link between the
CS and the US, and the participants might have used this propositional knowledge
to infer how much they liked the CS (De Houwer et al., 2005).
To sum up, the results imply that EC - like other forms of Pavlovian condition-
ing (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009) - is not driven by simple
automatic Hebbian learning processes. Rather it seems to be a function of - at least
- attentional, mnemonic and higher-order propositional-learning processes. The re-
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sults reported in manuscripts A and B both show that EC depends on those cogni-
tive resources that enable propositional learning and the acquisition of contingency
knowledge (i.e. a contingency focus of attention and working-memory resources). In
manuscript C, it is further shown that EC is sensitive to subjective beliefs about
the CS-US contingency. Thus, particularly the results reported in manuscript C are
best accounted for by assuming that the acquisition of EC involves the formation of
propositional knowledge about the CS-US relation (cf. De Houwer, 2007, 2009).
Nevertheless, although EC, like other forms of Pavlovian conditioning appears to
require a certain amount of conscious awareness and attention, there seem to be
functional differences, as well. Replicating previous findings, (e.g., Baeyens et al.,
1993), it was shown in manuscript C that EC occurs independently of objective
values of contingency. Similarly other recent the studies have shown that EC, unlike
other forms of conditioning, is not sensitive to extinction (e.g., Dwyer et al., 2007)
and blocking (Beckers et al., 2009). This implies that EC is subject primarily to
higher-order cognitive variables (i.e. subjective appraisal) rather than to those pro-
cedural variables that are known to modulate the extent of conditioned responses
in other forms of associative learning.
3.3. Practical implications
Notwithstanding the fundamental research perspective of the present thesis, it is
possible to derive a few tentative conclusions with respect to applications of the EC
phenomenon.
Particularly with respect to advertising psychology, practical implications may be
derived from the results shown in manuscript A. Whenever a commercial intends to
yield a positive appraisal of a product by pairing it with other positively valenced
stimuli (e.g., holiday scenes, healthy and sporty people or beautiful women), the
advertiser has to assure that the observers of the commercial do not only attend
to the stimuli themselves but also to the relation between the product and these
positive stimuli. This might be accomplished by presenting the product in close
temporal or spatial proximity with the reinforcer or by introducing a salient relation
between the product and the positive stimuli with regard to contents. Furthermore,
it will be easier for an observer to attend to the CS-US contingency if there are not
too many other - maybe more plausible - contingencies present in a commercial. For
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example, attention might be distracted from the contingency between the happiness
of a person and a the consumption of a particular yoghurt if the observer notices
another salient contingency between happiness and physical exercises.
The results of manuscript B might also have practical implications for the de-
sign of advertisements, particularly television commercials. In order to achieve an
affective change with respect to the product, advertisers should take care not to
overload a spot with irrelevant content. Whenever plenty of additional stimuli are
presented during a commercial in the same stimulus modality (thus calling for the
same working memory module) as either the product (CS) or the affective stimulus
(US), encoding the contingency might be impaired, preventing the observer from
acquiring the desired attitudes towards the product. Nevertheless, future studies
should investigate the role of working memory capacity in more realistic consumer
settings, and also with visual stimuli, for instance.
In manuscript C, it was shown that EC is sensitive to propositional knowledge
about the statistical CS-US contingency. This has practical implications, for in-
stance, with respect to taste preferences and aversions. In order to change the aver-
sion of - say low-fat products - it is not sufficient to only pair them with highly posi-
tive stimuli (e.g., healthiness), but to make the person believe that low-fat products
are contingently associated with healthiness (i.e. they should be supposed to induce
healthiness). In order to make the observer believe in a strong causal relationship
between the product and a reinforcing outcome, advertisers may want to take advan-
tage of contingency-judgment biases like the outcome density effect (see Allan, 1993,
for a review on biases in contingency learning). A rather simple alternative could be
to present the product in close temporal and/or spatial proximity with the outcome
which is also known to increase the perceived causal efficacy (e.g., Anderson & Sheu,
1995). The results imply that evaluative responses towards stimuli (e.g., acquired
aversions) can be changed even without actually confronting the subject with the
stimulus contingencies. Instead, it seems to be crucial to change the subject’s be-
liefs about the co-occurrences with certain (negative) outcomes. This, however, may
not hold true for Pavlovian conditioning of physiological or behavioral responses
(cf. Vansteenwegen et al., 2006). Future applied studies thus have to show whether
propositional knowledge about the CS-US contingency has an effect on variables like
purchase intention or purchase behavior, as well.
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3.4. Limitations and future perspectives
The present studies have shown that attention, working memory and propositional
knowledge influence the acquisition and/or the magnitude of EC. It appears rea-
sonable that a contingency focus of attention is necessary in order to successfully
encode the CS-US contingency in working memory which in turn is assumed to be
precondition for the acquisition of contingency knowledge (compare Figure 1.5.1).
This assumed sequence of processes, however, has not been addressed directly in
this work. Future studies should clarify (a) the interrelations between attention and
working memory during the acquisition of EC, and (b) the causal relation between
these resources on the formation of contingency judgments, contingency awareness
and EC. Furthermore, it should be purposed to separate the cognitive resources that
are necessary for EC to occur (e.g., a contingency focus) from those processes that
modulate the magnitude of EC effects (e.g., contingency judgments).
As outlined above, the fact that propositional processes seem to be involved in the
acquisition of new affective-evaluative responses is of great theoretical and practical
importance. However, it would be premature to conclude that automatic processes
will not contribute to the acquisition of EC. In order to account for the conflict-
ing results with respect to contingency awareness (e.g., Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b;
Dickinson & Brown, 2007; Walther & Nagengast, 2006), future EC studies should
try to identify those conditions in which the evaluative learning may be elicited au-
tomatically, i.e. without attention or working memory capacity available. In a recent
study by Ruys and Stapel (2009, but see Dedonder, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Kuppens,
2010) one potential factor has been identified that appears determine whether con-
tingency awareness is required or not for EC to occur. Their data indicate that the
novelty of the CS may be a moderating variable. Whereas EC was demonstrated
in the absence of contingency knowledge for high-novelty stimuli, awareness seems
to be necessary to change the liking of an already well-known CS. Thus, automatic
processes might be more relevant for the acquisition than for the change of affective-
evaluative responses. Furthermore, novelty or familiarity may also have an impact on
controlled propositional-learning processes like explicit memory or attention which
were shown to be crucial during EC. Automatic processes might, for example, direct
attention to the CS-US contingencies during conditioning and thus contribute to
the acquisition of EC. More studies are needed that intend to separate automatic
3.4 Limitations and future perspectives 57
and controlled sources of EC (e.g., by means of the method introduced by Jacoby,
19911; see Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b).
In line with De Houwer’s (2007) conceptual analysis, EC has been defined as an
effect rather than as a process in the present thesis: It has been referred to the actual
change in the valence of stimuli due to the fact that they were paired in a certain
manner. This definition implies that there can be different causes of the same EC
effect, and some of these causes may in fact be automatic processes, not requiring
conscious awareness about the CS-US relationship. The studies reported in this
doctoral dissertation, however, strongly suggest that aware propositional learning
about the CS-US contingencies does not counteract with EC (compare Hammerl
& Fulcher, 2005), but rather produces reliable effects of EC. This mechanism was
shown to require a specific focus of attention as well as working memory capacity
to be available during the exposure to the CS-US pairings.
1To dissociate conscious (intentional) and automatic processes, Jacoby (1991) combined a facilita-
tion paradigm with an interference paradigm. Whereas in the first kind of task, automatic pro-
cesses are supposed to facilitate performance (e.g. priming in a stem completion task, Forster,
Booker, Schacter, & Davis, 1990), in the latter one, automatic processes tend to produce errors
(e.g. in the Stroop task; Stroop, 1935). The logic is that the contributions of intentional (I) and
automatic (A) processes can be computed by comparing the performance in a facilitation task
where automatic and intentional influences act in concert (performance = A + I) with the
performance in an interference task in which they act in opposition (performance = A − I).
In the context of a memory recognition test, intentional processes (recollection) are used ei-
ther to increase the probability of correct recognitions by selecting items (facilitation) or to
decrease the probability of false recognitions by rejecting items that stem automatic influences
(interference).
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Abstract
Although evaluative conditioning has occasionally been demonstrated in the absence
of contingency awareness, many recent studies imply that its acquisition depends on
the availability of attentional resources during conditioning. In previous experiments
attention has typically been manipulated in a general way rather than looking at
the particular focus of attention. The present study investigated the role of a focus
on the CS-US contingency. Two separate distraction tasks were designed that either
diverted attention from the stimuli or directed it to the stimuli while drawing atten-
tion away from the contingency between the stimuli. Both types of distraction were
shown to eliminate evaluative conditioning. Significant evaluative conditioning was
observed in a third group of participants who were required to attend the contin-
gencies. A mediation analysis showed that the observed discrepancy in evaluative
conditioning effects between groups was mediated by contingency awareness. The
results imply that attention in terms of a stimulus focus is not sufficient for evalu-
ative conditioning to occur. Rather, attention to the contingencies between stimuli
appears to be crucial in evaluative conditioning, because it is supposed to foster the
acquisition of contingency awareness.
1This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in Cognition
and Emotion [copyright Taylor & Francis]. It is available online at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02699931.2011.565036
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5.1. Revisiting the relation between contingency
awareness and attention: Evaluative
conditioning relies on a contingency focus
Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a change in the valence of a stimulus that
results from pairing it with an affective stimulus. During the acquisition phase of
a typical EC paradigm (Levey & Martin, 1975; Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh,
1990), stimuli (conditioned stimuli; CS) are presented together with either a strongly
liked or disliked stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus; US). This usually produces
a change in the liking of the CSs in the direction of the valence of the US which
can be measured, for instance, by means of subjective ratings before and after the
acquisition phase. Thus, EC is a form of conditioning that looks at changes in the
liking of the CS (e.g. De Houwer, 2007). However, the phenomenon is not yet
fully understood and there appear to be functional dissociations between EC and
other forms of Pavlovian conditioning (e.g. autonomic conditioning) concerning,
for instances, the role of statistical contingency between the CS and the US (e.g.
Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 1993), or cue competition (e.g. blocking; Beckers, De
Viqo, & Baeyens, 2009, but see Purkis & Lipp, in press).
The most controversial question in EC research, however, refers to the impor-
tance of cognitive resources available during the acquisition, and particularly the
question of whether EC depends on contingency awareness (e.g. Jones, Olson, &
Fazio, 2010). Classical conditioning is assumed to occur only after the participant
has become aware of the contingencies between the CS and the US (Lovibond &
Shanks, 2002; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Having participants work
on a distraction task during autonomic conditioning was shown to reduce both con-
tingency awareness and the strength of conditioned electro-dermal responses (e.g.
Dawson, 1970). By contrast, EC has been reported in subjects who were unable to
recall the stimulus contingencies (e.g. Baeyens et al., 1990; Walther & Nagengast,
2006) and even after having experimentally reduced contingency awareness either
by means of a distraction task (e.g. Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001) or by presenting
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the USs subliminally (De Houwer, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1994; De Houwer, Baeyens, &
Hendrickx, 1997). Some studies even reported a reversal of the typical valence shift
when contingency awareness had been induced (Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Hammerl
& Fulcher, 2005). In opposition to these findings, however, many recent studies re-
ported EC to occur (a) only in subjects who were aware of the CS-US contingencies
and (b) only in those pairings that a subject was aware of (e.g. Pleyers, Corneille,
Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Stahl, Unkelbach, & Corneille,
2009). In fact, although reliable effects of EC have been identified in the absence
of contingency awareness, as well, a recent meta-analysis reported the effects to be
larger in participants who were aware of the contingencies (Hofmann, De Houwer,
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Stahl et al. (2009) proposed to distinguish
between remembering a particular US (identity awareness) and remembering the va-
lence of the US (valence awareness), and their results imply that valence awareness
is sufficient for EC to occur.
There are two common strategies to experimentally manipulate the acquisition
of contingency awareness: Whereas subliminal presentation techniques are assumed
to prevent the (conscious) perception of the US and thus to make it impossible to
become aware of the CS-US contingency (De Houwer et al., 1997), distraction tasks
are supposed to reduce awareness by diverting the subject’s attention (Fulcher &
Hammerl, 2001). It is unclear, however, whether an effect of distraction on EC is due
to the reduction of contingency awareness or to a lack of attention. To separate the
effects of attention and contingency awareness, Field and Moore (2005, experiment 2)
conducted a study that directly compared both methods: Contingency awareness was
manipulated by varying the US exposure duration and attention was manipulated
via secondary tasks. Attention was either enhanced by asking the participants to
memorize the order of the stimuli or diverted by means of a counting-backwards
task. EC occurred only in participants who focused their attention to the CS and the
US, irrespective of whether the USs were presented subliminally or supraliminally.
There was no EC in distracted participants. These results imply that the focus of
attention rather than contingency awareness is crucial during the acquisition of EC
(Field & Moore, 2005)2. Similarly, Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, and Luminet (2009)
2Field and Moore (2005) reported that more participants became aware of the supraliminally
presented contingencies in the non-distracted group than in the distracted group. Thus the
manipulation of attention may also have affected contingency awareness. Statistically, however,
contingency awareness as a covariate did not affect EC. Further, if contingency awareness was
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found EC to be eliminated if attention is diverted during the acquisition by having
participants work on a two-back task. However, they argued that the attentional
effects on EC can be explained with differences in contingency awareness.
To account for these rather controversial effects of attentional distraction on EC
(compare Field & Moore, 2005; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Pleyers et al., 2009), it
might be helpful to have a closer look at the particular focus of attention during
conditioning. Previous studies did not look at whether attention had been focused
(a) on the stimuli (i.e. the CS and the US) or (b) on the contingency relationship
between these stimuli. Whereas a contingency focus is supposed to be possible only
if attention has been assigned to the stimuli, participants might attend to the stim-
uli without focusing on the contingency. Furthermore, a contingency focus might
be necessary for the acquisition of contingency awareness. It is unclear whether dis-
traction tasks like those used in previous studies (e.g. Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001)
diverted attention from the stimuli or whether they only prevented the participants
from attending to the contingencies. This distinction could be crucial with regard to
the divergent results, since the acquisition of EC might depend on a specific focus
of attention during conditioning. If attention being paid to the stimuli is sufficient
for EC to occur (Field & Moore, 2005), then it should not matter whether attention
has been assigned to the contingency relationship or not. However, if contingency
awareness is crucial during the acquisition (Pleyers et al., 2009), then EC should
depend on a contingency focus and be affected also by a task that selectively diverts
attention from the contingency but not from the stimuli themselves. Thus, partic-
ularly with respect to presumed importance of contingency awareness (Hofmann et
al., 2010), it would be interesting to test whether EC depends on a contingency
focus.
The present study intends to manipulate the focus of attention during condi-
tioning. For this purpose, two separate distraction tasks were employed, one that
generally captured attention like it was done in previous studies (full distraction;
see Field & Moore, 2005; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Pleyers et al., 2009), and
one that interfered with a contingency focus without diverting attention from the
stimuli (contingency distraction). The contingency focus was discouraged by asking
the subjects to learn additional irrelevant contingencies (i.e. associations of each
CS and US with a random digit). This task requires the subjects to pay attention
crucial, then no EC would have been expected with subliminally presented USs.
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to the stimuli. In a third group, participants were asked to memorize the CS-US
pairings (similar to the attention-enhanced group by Field & Moore, 2005). In con-
trast to both distraction groups, participants in this group are supposed to acquire
contingency awareness.
If attention is sufficient for EC to occur, then conditioning effects should be found
in the contingency distraction group and in the attention-enhanced group. By con-
trast, if EC depends on a contingency focus (and/or contingency awareness at the
time of conditioning) then the contingency-distraction task should interfere with EC
and reliable EC effects would be expected to occur only in the attention-enhanced
group.
5.2. Method
5.2.1. Participants
A total of 109 students (85 female) with a mean age of 24.1 (SD = 5.6) years were
recruited at the Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt and randomly assigned to either
the attention-enhanced group (n = 38), the contingency-distraction group (n = 32)
and the full-distraction group (n = 39). By deliberately not including advanced
students of psychology, the probability of subjects being na¨ıve with respect to the
conditioning hypothesis was increased. The experiment was run within a course in a
computer pool with groups of seven to twenty-four persons tested simultaneously. A
session took about 45 minutes. The subjects received course credits for participation.
5.2.2. Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimulus set consisted of 55 pictures of ads showing either people (e.g. eating,
smoking or sport activities), natural sceneries (e.g. an office or a vineyard), or objects
(e.g. vases or cars). The stimuli did not contain any product information or verbal
content. The pictures were digitized as 500 × 666 pixel image files (256 colors)
and displayed centered in upright format against a gray background on a wide-
screen TFT monitor. Stimulus presentations and evaluative response registrations
were controlled by a MATLAB script using the Psychphysics Toolbox extensions
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
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5.2.3. Procedure
Each participant was seated in front of a monitor on which the first instruction
was shown containing a cover story on the assumed aim of the study. In order to
mask the conditioning procedure, subjects were told that the study investigated the
effect of liked and disliked artworks on concentration (in the full-distraction group
since their main task was to solve arithmetic problems) or on learning and memory
performance (in the other groups since their main task was a learning task). Since
the experiment was run within a course, the participants were instructed not to
talk during the experiment and they were encouraged to ask questions by calling
a tutor prior to each new task when they saw the specific instructions. Neighbors
were always assigned to different experimental conditions. The experimental session
consisted of three sequential phases: baseline, acquisition and test.
The baseline phase was identical for the three groups. The pictures were presented
in randomized order and the participants had to evaluate each stimulus by means of
a 21-category scale ranging from −10 (disliked) through 0 (neutral) to +10 (liked).
Responses were given by clicking with the mouse on an area of the scale. They were
encouraged to make quick and spontaneous responses. The first 10 ratings were used
as training trials to familiarize the participant with the rating procedure and these
stimuli were not used in the following phases. Based on the remaining ratings, 3
pairs consisting of a neutral picture (the ratings of which fell closest to zero) and a
liked picture (highest ratings) and 3 pairs of a neutral and a disliked picture (lowest
ratings) were randomly assigned for each participant.
During the acquisition phase, these 6 picture-picture pairings were presented 10
times each in randomized order. The same pairing did not appear in more than
two consecutive trials. In each trial, the CS preceded the US. Both stimuli were
presented for 2 s and separated by a trace interval of 1 s. The inter-trial interval
was 4 s. Subjects in the attention-enhanced group had to learn those stimulus pair-
ings. They were informed that their learning success would be tested at the end
of the experiment (see appendix for the instruction). In the full-distraction group,
math equations were presented during the paired stimulus presentations (two-digit
summation and subtraction) and the subjects had to decide whether the equation
was correct or not by pressing a key (see appendix). To divert attention from the
stimuli in the center, the equations were randomly presented at the margins of the
screen (top, bottom, left or right). Each equation disappeared as soon as a response
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was made. In order to guarantee that the equations appeared in all stages of a con-
ditioning trial (i.e. during stimulus exposure and during the intervals in between),
they were displayed for a randomly distributed maximum period of time (between
6 and 12 s). The subjects had time to solve a problem until the next problem ap-
peared. A feedback was shown immediately after each response telling the subject
whether the response was correct. Participants in the contingency-distraction group
had to work on an irrelevant pair-associate learning task which was designed to
focus their attention to the stimuli while suppressing a focus to the contingencies
between the stimuli (see appendix). Their task was to learn 12 randomly generated
contingencies between each of the 12 pictures (CSs and USs) and a number (1, 2
or 3). They were required to press the respective key on the numeric pad whenever
a picture appeared. After responding, a short text message was presented above
the stimulus indicating whether the response was correct (e.g. ’1 is correct.’). The
feedback was shown until the picture disappeared, and it had to be used to learn
the picture-number contingencies.
In the test phase, subjects were asked to rate each picture a second time by
means of the same procedure as in the baseline phase. Afterwards, participants had
to recall the picture-picture pairings that were presented in the acquisition phase
in a forced-choice recognition test. Each CS was presented successively on the left
side of the screen together with a randomly arranged 3 × 2-matrix showing the 6
pictures which had presented as USs during the conditioning phase on the right side
of the screen (3 liked and 3 disliked pictures). The participants had to choose the
picture in the matrix that had previously been paired with the picture on the left by
clicking on it. They were requested to guess in case of uncertainty. A participant was
classified as identity-aware of a pairing if he or she identified the respective US. If a
participant selected a picture that was not the US but that had the same valence as
the respective US (according to the individual rating), the participant was classified
as valence-aware of the particular pairing.
5.3. Results
For all statistical tests, a p−value less than .05 was accepted as significant.
5.3 Results 78
5.3.1. Manipulation Check and Contingency Awareness
On average, participants in the full-distraction group correctly responded to 83%
(SD = 8%) of the math equations. In the contingency-distraction group, the average
percentage of correct responses increased from 53% (SD = 11%) in trials 1-20, via
74% (SD = 7%) in trials 21-40, to 85% (SD = 6%) in trials 41-60, indicating that
they successfully learned the irrelevant picture-number contingencies.
Subjects’ awareness of the US valence and the US identity is shown in Table 6.1. A
3 (group) × 2 (US valence) mixed-factors ANOVA revealed that valence awareness
differs significantly between groups, F (2, 106) = 59.09; p < .001. There was no
significant main effect of US valence, F (1, 106) = 1.94; p = .17, and no interaction,
F (2, 106) = 0.34; p = .71. Another ANOVA on identity awareness revealed a main
effect of group, as well, F (2, 106) = 147.56; p < .001. Again, there was no main effect
of US valence, F (1, 106) = 2.05; p = .16, and no interaction, F (2, 106) = 1.83; p =
.17.
Additional t-tests revealed that valence awareness in the attention-enhanced group
differed significantly from both the full-distraction group, t(75) = 12.42; p < .001
and the contingency-distraction group t(68) = 8.20; p < .001. There was no
significant difference in valence awareness between the two distraction groups,
t(69) = 1.91; p = .06. Likewise, identity awareness in the attention-enhanced group
differed significantly from both the full-distraction group, t(75) = 18.76; p < .001
and the contingency-distraction group t(68) = 12.68; p < .001. However, it was sig-
nificantly greater in the contingency-distraction group than in the full-distraction
group, t(69) = 2.80; p < .01.
5.3.2. EC effects
As a measure of EC, pre-post difference were computed for each CS by subtracting
the evaluative ratings in the baseline phase from those obtained in the test phase.
Mean subjective rating differences are shown in Table 5.1. A 3 × 2 mixed-factors
ANOVA on the rating differences revealed a significant main effect of US valence,
F (1, 106) = 4.78; p < .05, and, more importantly, a significant interaction between
US valence and group, F (2, 106) = 3.25; p < .05. Additional paired t-tests within
groups revealed a significant EC effect only in the attention-enhanced group, t(37) =
3.58; p < .001, but neither in the full-distraction group, t(38) = 0.09; p = .93, nor in
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Table 5.1.: Mean contingency awareness and mean subjective rating differences (EC)
of CS pictures that were paired with a liked or a disliked US (standard
deviations in parentheses).
Group
Attention Enhanced Contingency Distraction Full Distraction
(n = 38) (n = 32) (n = 39)
Valence awarenessa
liked US 2.95 (0.32) 1.81 (0.93) 1.46 (0.85)
disliked US 2.97 (0.16) 1.94 (0.95) 1.64 (0.78)
Identity awarenessa
liked US 2.95 (0.32) 0.97 (0.98) 0.64 (0.71)
disliked US 2.92 (0.48) 1.25 (0.78) 0.64 (0.77)
Subjective rating differences
liked US 0.31 (2.03) −0.54 (2.05) −0.06 (1.73)
disliked US −0.91 (2.46) −0.67 (2.43) −0.09 (1.78)
a Mean number out of 3 CS-US pairings, that a subject was valence/identity-aware.
the contingency-distraction group, t(31) = 0.25; p = .80.
An EC score was computed by multiplying each pre-post rating difference with the
respective US valence index (1 = liked US; −1 = disliked US). The EC score was
significantly stronger in the attention-enhanced group than in the full-distraction
group, t(75) = 2.64; p < .05. The difference in EC between the attention-enhanced
group and the contingency-distraction group was marginally significant, t(68) =
1.87; p = .07 (two-tailed). There was no difference in EC, however, between the two
distraction groups, t(69) = 0.18; p = .86.
5.3.3. Contingency Awareness and EC
The EC score was weakly but significantly correlated with both valence awareness,
r = .23; t(107) = 2.42; p < .05, and identity awareness r = .22; t(107) = 2.31; p <
.05.
The data of the distraction groups were split into valence-aware and valence-
unaware items. In the contingency-distraction group, US valence did neither affect
the rating differences of unaware items, t(43) = 0.77; p = .22, nor that of aware
items, t(57) = −0.20; p = .58. In the full-distraction group, there was no effect for
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unaware items either, t(68) = 0.83; p = .80, but there was a marginally significant
EC effect for aware items, t(68) = 1.62; p = .05. There were not enough unaware
items in the attention-enhanced group to perform a statistical test. The EC effect
in this group was significant when only aware items were included, t(74) = 2.40; p <
.01.
To test the mediating role of contingency awareness on the effect of the manipula-
tion on EC, a mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) was conducted with aware-
ness manipulation (attention-enhanced vs. distraction3) as the independent variable,
contingency awareness (valence awareness) as the mediator and the EC score as the
dependent variable. The manipulation significantly predicted the size of the EC
score, β = 0.57; t(107) = 2.55; p < .05, and it also influenced the level of contin-
gency awareness, β = 0.42; t(107) = 10.42; p < .001. Further, the size of the EC score
increased with the level of contingency awareness β = 0.88; t(107) = 2.31; p < .05.
Finally, there was an indirect effect of group on EC via contingency awareness, So-
bel’s Z = 2.26; p < .05. Thus, contingency awareness seems to mediate the impact
of the distraction on the magnitude of EC.
5.4. Discussion
As indicated by the main effect of US valence, the present paradigm produced a
robust effect of EC. The liking of previously neutral pictures changes as a result
of pairing them with liked or disliked stimuli. This effect, however, can be ascribed
mainly to those participants who were instructed to memorize the CS-US contin-
gencies, i.e. to the attention-enhanced group. By contrast, both distraction tasks
interfered with EC. In opposition to what has been reported by Fulcher and Ham-
merl (2001) and Hammerl and Fulcher (2005, but see Field & Moore, 2005), the
present results imply that contingency awareness does not eliminate but rather pro-
duces EC.
However, can the occurrence of EC in the attention-enhanced group actually be
attributed to the acquisition of contingency awareness? In order to memorize the
contingencies, participants in this group might have attended not only to the contin-
gencies but also to the pictures more than participants in the contingency-distraction
3The contingency distraction group and full distraction group were pooled for this analysis since
both distraction tasks were designed to reduce contingency awareness.
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group. Differences in EC could thus also be due to differences in the depth of process-
ing with respect to the pictures (more resources might be needed to learn picture-
picture associations than to learn picture-number associations). The results of the
mediation analysis, however, strongly suggest that the differences were produced
by contingency awareness (as measured by the recognition test). The secondary
tasks were shown to affect the magnitude of EC through their differential impact
on contingency awareness which is supposed to require attention being paid to the
contingencies. Furthermore, even participants in the full-distraction group showed
an EC effect with respect to individual CSs if they had recognized the respective
CS-US contingencies. This pattern of results implies that both distraction tasks in-
terfered with EC by preventing the participants from attending to the contingencies
and from acquiring contingency awareness.
In line with previous findings, the data show that EC occurs only if the participant
reached awareness of the CS-US contingencies (e.g. Pleyers et al., 2009; Stahl &
Unkelbach, 2009), and only for those stimulus contingencies that a subject was aware
of (Pleyers et al., 2007). Additionally, the mediation analysis showed that differences
in EC between groups were produced by contingency awareness. Furthermore, EC
effects were found in those CSs of which a participant was not able to recall the
identity but only the valence of the contingent US. Thus, like in previous studies,
valence awareness appears to be sufficient for EC to occur (Stahl et al., 2009, at
least if EC is measured by means of subjective ratings). All these findings imply
that contingency awareness is crucial in EC.
The main purpose of the study was to investigate the role of the specific focus of
attention on EC. Since both distraction tasks eliminated conditioning, the results
seem to replicate the finding that EC does not occur when attention is diverted dur-
ing the acquisition (Field & Moore, 2005; Pleyers et al., 2009). EC seems to require
attentional resources (Pleyers et al., 2009). In addition to these studies, the present
results suggest that it is crucial to attend to the contingency. It turned out that keep-
ing the focus of attention on the stimuli of interest (i.e. the CS and the US), does
not preserve EC when attention is diverted from the CS-US contingency. Interest-
ingly, the degree to which participants were contingency-aware (valence awareness)
did not differ between the contingency-distraction and the full-distraction group.
Thus, focusing attention to the stimuli did not foster the acquisition of contingency
knowledge. This suggests that the distraction tasks used in the present study have
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modulated the focus of attention independently of contingency awareness. Admit-
tedly, the focus of attention was not measured in a direct way. The secondary task
performance data, however, indicate that subjects were engaged in the tasks and
focused their attention either to the CSs and the USs or to the math equations.
It would be interesting though to also directly measure the focus of attention dur-
ing conditioning in future studies, e.g. bye means of eye-tracking in case of visual
stimuli.
The results imply that EC depends on a contingency focus during conditioning
which in turn is supposed to enable the participant to memorize the contingencies
and become contingency-aware. In contrast to the conclusions drawn by Field and
Moore (2005), the present results further suggest that focusing attention to the
stimuli is not sufficient for EC to occur. Admittedly, this conclusion is based on
a null effect, i.e. the diversion of attention from contingency eliminated EC. This,
of course, is due to the fact that a task that diverts attention from the stimuli
while focusing it to the contingency appears to be difficult to arrange empirically
and would be even theoretically impossible when assuming that a stimulus focus is
necessary for attending to the contingency between the stimuli. Further, it appears
unlikely that the absence of EC is just a chance effect since the statistical power
(1− β) to obtain a significant medium effect of EC (d = 0.52; see Hofmann et al.,
2010) with 32 subjects in the contingency distraction group is .89. Moreover, EC
effects were found also in the full-distraction group when the participant acquired
awareness of the respective CS-US contingency. This indicates that the absence of
EC is not due to chance but a result of the attentional distraction which suppressed
EC.
Thus the data suggest that merely focusing attention to the CS and the US does
not produce EC when preventing subjects from focusing to and learning the contin-
gencies. Related to this finding, a recent study has shown that EC also depends on
another dimension of the focus of attention, i.e. the valence focus (Gast & Rother-
mund, 2011). EC occurred only if the task required the participants to focus on
valence but not if they were attending (only) to other stimulus properties (e.g. age).
Thus, in addition to the contingency focus, it seems to be crucial whether attention
has been assigned to the valence dimension. It would be interesting whether both
a contingency focus and a valence focus are necessary for EC to occur or whether
these are different ways to produce EC. According to the propositional account (e.g.
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Mitchell et al., 2009), for instance, EC could result from propositions either about
the CS-US contingency or about the valence of the CS.
To summarize, a method was presented that successfully modulated the focus of
attention by means of specifically demanding secondary tasks. The results imply
that EC occurs if the subject focuses attention not only to the stimuli but also to
the contingencies between stimuli. Additionally, EC was found only if the partici-
pant reached awareness of the contingencies. Thus, the data are in conflict with two
assumptions that have been raised in the literature being (a) that there is a dissoci-
ation between EC and contingency awareness (e.g. Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001), and
(b) that attention (being paid to the stimuli) rather than contingency awareness is
critical for EC to occur (Field & Moore, 2005). EC seems to require a specific con-
tingency focus of attention which is assumed to foster the acquisition of contingency
awareness. Though attention is supposed to be necessary, EC does not occur when
the subject is not attending to the contingencies. This is in line with the assump-
tion that EC is sensitive to both attentional resources and contingency awareness
(Pleyers et al., 2009). Finally, the data are in line also with the assumption that
contingency awareness moderates the acquisition of EC (Hofmann et al., 2010).
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Appendix
Instructions
Instructions given to the attention-enhanced group prior to the
conditioning phase (translated from German)
In order to simulate an everyday situation (e.g. passing several advertisements during
a shopping tour), you will now see some of the ads repeatedly. Thereby, two pictures
will always be presented consecutively. Please try to memorize as many of those
pairings as possible. At the end of the experiment, you will be required to recall
these pairings. Please contact the tutor now if you have any questions or press a key
to start the task.
Instructions given to the contingency-distraction group prior to the
conditioning phase (translated from German)
In order to simulate an everyday situation (e.g. passing several advertisements dur-
ing a shopping tour), you will now see some of the ads repeatedly. A prototypical
task in such a situation might be to remember certain product numbers. Therefore,
we assigned a certain number (1, 2 or 3) to each of the pictures. Your task is to
figure out the numbers belonging to each of the pictures. Please press the respective
key on the numeric pad whenever a picture appears on the screen. Of course, you
will have to guess in the beginning. After having pressed a key, a feedback will be
presented telling you whether the number was correct or not. Each picture will only
be presented shortly. So please try to press a key quickly. Please contact the tutor
now if you have any questions or press a key to start the task.
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Instructions given to the full-distraction group prior to the conditioning
phase (translated from German)
In order to simulate an everyday situation (e.g. passing several advertisements during
a shopping tour), you will now see some of the ads repeatedly. A prototypical task
in such a situation is to perform mental arithmetics (e.g. adding prices). Therefore,
several math equations will be presented next to the pictures. Your task is to decide
whether the equations are true or false. Please press ”1” if the equation is false and
press ”3” if the equation is correct. A new equation will appear approximately every
8 seconds. Please solve the new equation even if you did not yet give a response to
the previous one. Please try to work as quickly and accurately as possible. After
having pressed a key, a feedback will be presented telling you whether your response
was correct or wrong. Please try to watch the pictures simultaneously and keep your
gaze on the screen in order to avoid missing an equation. Please contact the tutor
now if you have any questions or press a key to start the task.
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Abstract
Evaluative conditioning refers to a change in the liking of a stimulus as a result of
pairing it with an affective stimulus. Three verbal evaluative conditioning experi-
ments addressed the role of the (phonological) working memory resources available
during acquisition. In experiments 1 and 2, participants were either producing or lis-
tening to irrelevant speech while memorizing CS-US word pairs. As a within-subjects
control, other pairs were presented in silence. While reliable evaluative conditioning
was observed in silence, particularly the articulation of irrelevant speech impaired
both contingency memory and conditioning. In experiment 3, working memory re-
sources were disrupted in a more passive way by playing back irrelevant speech and
different non-speech sounds. As expected, merely listening to irrelevant speech also
interfered both with contingency awareness and evaluative conditioning. These re-
sults show that the acquisition of new evaluative responses requires working memory
resources and challenge the assumption that evaluative learning is driven by auto-
matic processes. Item-based analyses of recognized and non-recognized CS-US pair-
ings revealed, however, that conditioning was not restricted to contingency-aware
pairings. This implies that, though working-memory resources are needed to encode
the CS-US contingencies, evaluative learning does not necessarily depend on the
acquisition of explicit contingency knowledge.
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6.1. Irrelevant speech prevents learning: On the
importance of working memory for evaluative
conditioning
Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a change in the valence of a stimulus that
is induced by pairing it (the conditioned stimulus; CS) with an either liked or dis-
liked stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus; US). Typically, the valence of the CS
assimilates the valence of the US (see Martin & Levey, 1978; De Houwer, Thomas,
& Baeyens, 2001; De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005, for reviews). The effect can
be explained in terms of Pavlovian conditioning the dependent measure being a
change in the evaluative response to the CS (De Houwer, 2007). Though researchers
have been interested in various forms of EC for several decades (e.g. Razran, 1954;
Levey & Martin, 1975; Stuart, Shimp, & Engle, 1987; Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den
Bergh, 1990; Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000; Dickinson & Brown, 2007), the exact pro-
cesses involved in the acquisition of EC are still poorly understood (e.g. De Houwer
et al., 2005). Particularly, the role of cognitive factors (controlled processes) like
contingency awareness or attentional resources during conditioning are discussed
controversially (e.g. Field & Moore, 2005; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002).
Some researchers consider EC to be based on an automatic process of associa-
tion formation that does not necessarily depend on the availability of attentional
resources or awareness (e.g. Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001a; Martin & Levey, 1994;
Walther & Langer, 2008). This conclusion is supported by reports of EC in subjects
who were unaware of the stimulus contingencies (Baeyens et al., 1990; Dickinson &
Brown, 2007; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005; Walther & Nagengast, 2006). Furthermore,
there are studies that actively limited cognitive resources by having the participants
work on a secondary task during conditioning. Whereas distraction during Pavlo-
vian conditioning was consistently shown to reduce both contingency awareness and
the extent of conditioned (electrodermal) responses (e.g. Dawson, 1970; Dawson
& Biferno, 1973), actively limiting the participants’ attentional resources did not
always eliminate EC (Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b). Since
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the distraction task reduced the participants’ contingency awareness compared to
an awareness-induced group, the authors concluded that EC cannot rely on con-
tingency knowledge1. Perhaps even more convincing instances of unaware EC are
provided by experiments with subliminally presented USs (using backward masking,
e.g. De Houwer, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1994; De Houwer, Baeyens, & Hendrickx, 1997;
Field & Moore, 2005). Since subjects were unable to identify the stimuli themselves,
it is unlikely that they acquired contingency knowledge2.
By contrast, others assume EC to rely on contingency awareness or attentional
processing of the stimulus associations (e.g. Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzer-
byt, 2007; De Houwer, 2007; Stahl, Unkelbach, & Corneille, 2009). Recently, EC
effects were found to be significantly smaller or even eliminated in subjects that
were not aware of the stimulus contingencies (Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox,
2007) or when attention was diverted by means of secondary tasks (Field & Moore,
2005; Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Luminet, 2009). Additionally, it has been shown
that, within subjects, EC is restricted to those CSs of whose respective USs the par-
ticipant has become aware of (Dawson et al., 2007; Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl &
Unkelbach, 2009; Wardle, Mitchell, & Lovibond, 2007). Stahl et al. (2009), however,
demonstrated that awareness of the valence of the US (rather than of its identity) is
sufficient for EC to occur. Similarly, Gast and Rothermund (2011) found EC to oc-
cur only if the secondary task to be performed during conditioning focused subjects’
attention on the valence dimension.
These findings clearly support the assumption that EC depends on the availability
cognitive resources during conditioning. Although there are studies that convincingly
demonstrated EC in the absence of awareness, a recent meta-analysis of evaluative
learning identified contingency awareness to be an important factor determining the
magnitude of EC (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010).
There is only weak evidence for EC in subjects who are not aware of the stimulus
contingencies (but see C. R. Jones, Olson, & Fazio, 2010) However, if EC depends
on contingency knowledge, then the encoding of the CS-US contingencies should
be crucial. Particularly, during the acquisition, representations of the CS and the
US are expected to occupy working memory resources. Consistent with this idea,
1Occasionally, even a reversal of the conditioning effect was reported when contingency awareness
was induced experimentally (Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005).
2It is still unclear, however, why EC could not yet be found reliably after subliminal presentations
of the CS (unpublished data mentioned by O¨hman, 1988).
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Brunstorm and Higgs (2002) found EC to be diminished when participants were
performing a counting task during conditioning and the authors concluded that EC
is sensitive to attentional constraints on working memory. In addition to this effect,
the present study intends to explore the role of encoding the stimulus pairings during
conditioning in more detail, by actively limiting working memory capacity. To that
effect, different grades of working memory disruption were produced within subjects.
If EC relies on the processing of CSs and USs in working memory, then it should
vary with the availability of working memory resources.
To accomplish this, we developed a paradigm to limit the phonological working
memory capacity in a verbal conditioning procedure (similar to C. K. Staats &
Staats, 1957). However, the subjects’ task was to memorize the CS-US pairs while
listening to or uttering irrelevant speech that is assumed to impair the encoding
of the verbal materials in working memory. Thereby, a situation much like in the
irrelevant sound paradigm (e.g. Colle & Welsh, 1976; Salame´ & Baddeley, 1982;
D. M. Jones & Macken, 1993) is created, according to which the presentation of
task-irrelevant speech (or other sounds such as changing tones) reliably impairs
performance on serial recall and (to a lesser extent) other memory processes like
pair-associate learning. The acoustic properties moderating the distraction effect
are so well understood by now (see Banbury, Macken, Tremblay, & Jones, 2001;
Hughes & Jones, 2001, for reviews) that it appears reasonable to generate irrele-
vant sound sequences that produce distinct, and well-defined degrees of memory
impairment. Stationary, continuous noise, for example does not produce any change
in performance compared to a quiet control condition (e.g. Ellermeier & Zimmer,
1997; D. M. Jones, Miles, & Page, 1990; Salame´ & Baddeley, 1982). Free-running
speech, by contrast, has been shown to generate strong decrements in recall, while
sequences of intermittent tones changing in frequency typically produce intermedi-
ate levels of memory impairment (e.g. D. M. Jones & Macken, 1993; Klatte, Kilcher,
& Hellbru¨ck, 1995; LeCompte, Neely, & Wilson, 1997; Salame´ & Baddeley, 1989;
K. Zimmer, Ghani, & Ellermeier, 2008).
There are different theoretical accounts on how the presence of irrelevant sound
should affect the encoding of CS-US pairings, and thus contingency knowledge. The
‘phonological loop’ model (Baddeley, 1986, 2003) suggests that participants will
phonologically encode the CS-US pairs for rehearsal. Simultaneously presented ir-
relevant sound is bound to gain automatic access to the same memory module thus
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competing for the limited capacity of the phonological store and rehearsal mech-
anism. The ‘object-oriented episodic record’ (O-OER) model (D. M. Jones, 1993;
D. M. Jones, Beaman, & Macken, 1996; Macken & Jones, 1995), on the other hand,
postulates that the pre-attentively registered serial information perceived in the ir-
relevant auditory stream will interfere with serial learning of the to-be-remembered
word pairs by degrading the links between items rather than the memory trace of
the items themselves. Both models would predict that distraction by irrelevant au-
ditory material during conditioning should also reduce contingency memory either -
according to the phonological loop model - depending on how speech-like (i.e. suited
for phonological encoding) it is, or - according to the O-OER model - as a function
of the amount of ‘changing-state’ information present in the irrelevant sound.
Another option for disrupting phonological short-term memory is to have subjects
exercise articulatory suppression, e.g. by making them repeatedly utter a string of
syllables (Baddeley, Lewis, & Vallar, 1984). The major difference is that the irrel-
evant materials are produced rather than merely processed by the subjects. The
‘phonological loop’ model suggests that articulatory suppression is even more effec-
tive in disrupting the encoding of phonological items in working memory. Indeed,
Neath, Farley, and Surprenant (2003) report that the magnitude of disruption pro-
duced by articulatory suppression is about twice that of irrelevant speech. In contrast
to the ‘phonological loop’ model, however, the O-OER model does not predict dif-
ferent levels of distraction when comparing articulatory suppression and irrelevant
speech in a serial learning task (Macken & Jones, 1995).
Thus, in order to generate different degrees of working memory disruption during
EC (and within subjects), participants had to memorize verbal CS-US pairs while
different types of either speech-like or changing-state sounds were presented, or while
they were required to continuously articulate irrelevant words. If the availability
of working memory resources during the acquisition is critical for EC to occur,
then the extent of learning should vary with these modulations. In addition, it is
assumed that the different experimental conditions go along with distinguishable
levels of contingency awareness, i.e. increasing phonological distraction is expected
to gradually impair the acquisition of contingency memory. Fulcher and Hammerl
(2001a) argue that if there is a causal relationship between contingency awareness
and evaluative learning, then EC should increase when awareness is enhanced and
it should decrease when awareness is reduced. By measuring contingency memory
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on the level of word pairs that were learned under different conditions of distraction
(i.e. using an item-based analysis of awareness, see Pleyers et al., 2007), the present
study also intends to contribute to the debate on the role contingency awareness in
EC.
6.2. Experiment 1
The main purpose of experiment 1 is to establish an effect of phonological distraction
during evaluative learning. Therefore, we compared the impact of no distraction with
that produced by irrelevant speech and articulatory suppression. Different pairings
of neutral non-words and either positive or negative words were presented in silence,
concurrent with the playback of irrelevant speech, or while the subject were exer-
cising articulatory suppression. Both irrelevant speech and articulatory suppression
are supposed to impair the encoding of the verbal CSs and USs in working mem-
ory. If working memory capacity is crucial to EC, then both types of disruption
should interfere. As a consequence of poorer encoding, also contingency knowledge
(measured by recognition performance after conditioning) is expected to be lower
in the phonological distraction conditions, as well. Furthermore, the ‘phonological
loop model’ predicts a stronger impact of articulatory suppression on contingency
knowledge compared to passively registered irrelevant speech.
6.2.1. Method
Participants
A total of twenty-nine participants (26 female) between 19 and 40 years of age
(M = 22.7;SD = 5.4) were recruited from the campus of Technische Universita¨t
Darmstadt. The majority were first-year students of psychology and none of them
understood or spoke Korean (the language of the irrelevant speech). Each participant
was tested individually in sessions of about 35 minutes.
Stimuli and apparatus
Fifty three-syllable non-words were generated by substituting or adding random
vowels to existing German male and female first names. For instance, the non-word
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‘Aguarg’ was derived from the name ‘Georg’3. Based on the baseline ratings made by
each subject, the most neutral of these non-words were used as CSs (see procedure).
Nine extremely positive and nine extremely negative German 3-syllable nouns
from the Berlin Affective Word List (BAWL; Vo, Jacobs, & Conrad, 2006) served
as positive and negative USs. Mean emotionality ratings of positive and negative
nouns were 2.20(SD = 0.82) and −2.24(SD = 0.73), respectively.
The experiment was run in a single-walled sound-attenuated listening room (IAC).
Visual stimuli (the non-words) were presented on a 19” TFT monitor (Philips) and
the distracting sounds were presented via headphones (Beyerdynamics DT-990).
Stimulus presentation and evaluative response measurements were controlled by a
Matlab program, using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli,
1997).
Design and Procedure
A 2 (US valence) × 3 (phonological distraction) design was implemented with re-
peated measures on both factors. Subjects were told the purpose of the experiment
was to find appropriate liked and disliked names for the characters in a new comic
strip.
In the baseline phase subjects were required to rate each non-word (the potential
comic characters’ names) by means of a 21-category scale (ranging from −10 to
+10). The non-words were presented successively in randomized order. Subjects
were encouraged to make quick and spontaneous responses. The first 10 ratings
were used for training and not considered in the following phases. Based on the
remaining 40 baseline ratings, those 18 non-words the ratings of which fell closest to
zero were selected to be used as CSs. Each CS was randomly assigned to an either
positive or negative word from the BAWL.
In the acquisition phase, subjects were told to learn pairings of names (i.e. some
of the non-words) and surnames (i.e. the BAWL words). Six CS-US pairings (3
with a positive and 3 with a negative US) were presented in silence, another six
were presented together with irrelevant speech and during still another six pairings
3In a pilot study (N = 6) the names were rated by independent raters with respect to pleas-
antness (M = −0.8;SD = 2.4; -10 = very unpleasant, +10 = very pleasant) and the
presumed gender (M = −2.1;SD = 3.9; -10 = certainly male, +10 = certainly female),
indicating sufficient variance between stimuli. Further, the ratings of pleasantness were not
correlated with the gender ratings (r = .09, n.s.).
6.2 Experiment 1 95
the participants were required to continuously articulate the German words ‘drei-
vier-fu¨nf’ (‘three-four-five’). In each case, three pairings of each US valence were
combined with a particular distraction condition. These 18 pairings (3 pairings per
US valence × distraction condition) were presented six times each in randomized
order. Thus, a total of 108 trials was presented. The CSs and the USs were presented
for 1 s, separated by a trace interval of 0.5 s. The inter-trial interval was 6 s. Free-
running speech (a segment of a Korean poem recited by a male native speaker) was
used as the distraction sound played back in the irrelevant speech trials (adopted
from K. Zimmer et al., 2008). Unknown foreign speech was used to avoid any affec-
tive impact on the stimulus pairings due to the semantic content of the utterances.
The speech was presented at an RMS level corresponding to approximately 63 dB
SPL. A text message was displayed on the screen in each trial telling the subjects
whether they had to speak (in case of an articulatory suppression trial) or not (in
case of silence or irrelevant speech trials). The participants’ task was to learn the
assumed name-surname pairings and to ignore the speech. They were told that the
purpose was to find out which compound names could be most easily memorized.
Subsequently, in the test phase, each non-word was rated a second time using the
same procedure as in the baseline phase. Finally, contingency awareness was assessed
by means of a forced-choice recognition test. Each CS-US pair was displayed together
with five randomly-assigned pairs each consisting of a non-word and a word (which
had been used as CSs or USs in different combinations during the acquisition phase)
and the subjects had to choose the respective CS-US pair by clicking on it. To
minimize the probability of false ‘unaware’ classifications, subjects were encouraged
to guess whenever they were not sure.
At the end of the experiment, each subject was given a sheet of paper containing
several questions to assess the participants’ demand awareness. They had to specify,
for instance, what they thought the actual purpose of the study was, and whether
they felt being expected to behave in a certain way.
According to this final demand-awareness questionnaire, no subject was identified
to be aware of the purpose of the study.
6.2.2. Results
For all tests in experiments 1, 2, and 3, a p-value of less than .05 was accepted as
significant.
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Evaluative conditioning
Mean evaluative ratings of CS non-words before and after the conditioning phase are
illustrated in figure 6.1. Evaluative rating differences were computed by subtracting
the baseline ratings of each CS from those obtained after conditioning. A 2 (US
valence) × 3 (phonological distraction) repeated-measures ANOVA on these rating
differences revealed a significant main effect of US valence, F (1, 28) = 6.25; p <
.05. However, its interaction with phonological distraction was not significant,
F (2, 56) = 0.23; p = .79. There was also no main effect of phonological dis-
traction, F (2, 56) = 0.03; p = .97.
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Figure 6.1.: Evaluative ratings of non-words that were paired with positive or neg-
ative words either in silence or under conditions of irrelevant speech or
articulatory suppression (experiment 1).
In addition, contrasts were computed within the phonological distraction condi-
tions. Paired t-tests revealed marginally significant EC effects in the silence condi-
tion, t(28) = 2.01; p = .05; d = 0.47, and in the irrelevant speech condition,
t(28) = 2.09; p < .05; d = 0.47 , but there was no significant EC effect in the
articulatory suppression condition, t(28) = 1.00; p = .33; d = 0.28.
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Table 6.1.: Contingency memory in experiment 1 (in percentage correct, standard
deviations in parentheses).
Phonological distraction condition
silence irrelevant speech articulatory suppression
negative US 90.8 (29.1) 92.0 (27.3) 82.8 (38.0)
positive US 70.1 (46.0) 74.7 (43.7) 63.2 (48.5)
Contingency memory
Contingency memory, i.e. the percentage of correctly recognized CS-US pairings,
can be seen in table 6.1. Another 2 (US valence) × 3 (distraction condition)
repeated-measures ANOVA on contingency memory revealed a highly significant
main effect US valence, F (1, 28) = 22.82; p < .001. Even though recognition
scores are nearly 10% lower in the articulatory suppression condition, the main
effect of phonological distraction on recognition memory failed to reach statisti-
cal significance, F (2, 56) = 3.08; p = .05. There was no significant interaction
F (2, 56) = 0.14; p = .87.
Contingency memory and evaluative conditioning
The impact of contingency knowledge on EC was analyzed on an item level. There-
fore, the data were divided into those items that were recognized in the awareness
test and those that were not. For aware items (412 of a total of 29 × 18 = 522
items), the rating differences were M = −0.37(SD = 4.18) in case of disliked
USs and M = +0.82(SD = 4.14) in case of liked USs. This difference was
statistically significant, t(28) = 3.27; p < .01 (paired t-test). For non-recognized
items (110 items), the mean rating difference of CSs paired with disliked USs was
M = −0.67(SD = 4.29) whereas the rating difference of CSs paired with liked
USs was M = +0.40(SD = 3.95). However, this difference was not significant,
t(36) = 0.65; p = .52 (two-sample t-test).
6.2.3. Discussion
A significant EC effect was demonstrated in experiment 1: The liking of non-words
that were paired with positive words increased, whereas the liking of non-words that
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were paired with negative words decreased. A more detailed analysis revealed that
this effect was less robust when the subjects had to actively articulate numbers while
the contingencies were presented than when they were presented in silence or when
subjects were merely listening to speech. Whereas the active production of irrelevant
speech appears to impair conditioning, the mere processing of irrelevant speech thus
seems to have no effect.
Articulatory suppression also had its effect on contingency memory: Subjects’
recognition of CS-US pairings was clearly worse in this condition compared to the
silence or the irrelevant speech condition. Though the critical interaction between
phonological distraction and US valence was nearly significant, we did not find a
reliable effect of working memory modulations on EC, since irrelevant speech did not
impair EC more than silence did. This might be due to a ceiling effect with respect
to the level of contingency memory. Subjects’ awareness of the contingencies might
have reached a level that assures EC, even under conditions of working memory
disruption. Replicating the results reported by Pleyers et al. (2007), the conditioning
effects also appear to be restricted to those contingencies that subjects were aware
of. However, since only a minority of contingencies were not recognized, the non-
significant conditioning effect for the unaware items might also be due to a lack of
statistical power.
Rather unexpectedly, US valence had an effect on contingency memory, as well,
such that pairings with negative words were recognized much better than pairings
with positive words. However, this effect is in line with valence asymmetries that
have been reported in recognition memory tasks involving emotional stimuli (e.g.
Orthony, Turner, & Antos, 1983; Ohira, Winton, & Oyama, 1998). The remarkable
effect of US valence on contingency memory might have been facilitated by the se-
mantic content of the words used. Moreover, CS-US parings containing semantic
content are supposed to be much better recognizable in general than pairings with-
out any semantic associations. This could also account for the high overall level of
contingency knowledge in experiment 1. Therefore, we decided to conduct a second
experiment in which the rather unfamiliar non-words served both as CSs and USs.
By doing this, contingency memory is expected to be lower, thus avoiding a ceil-
ing effect, and phonological distraction might be more effective in modulating the
conditioning effect.
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6.3. Experiment 2
In experiment 2, the same phonological distractions as in experiment 1 were used:
CS-US pairings were either presented together with irrelevant speech or while sub-
jects were exercising articulatory suppression. Control pairings were presented in
silence. In order to reduce the overall level of working memory resources available
during conditioning, the pair-associate learning task was made more difficult by only
using non-words. By doing this, working memory modulations are expected to have
a stronger effect on conditioning. While EC is expected to be maximally inhibited
by articulatory suppression (like in experiment 1), we expect irrelevant speech to
interfere with EC, to some extent, as well.
6.3.1. Method
Participants
Another forty participants (28 female) with ages between 19 and 39 years
(M = 22.6; SD = 4.2) were recruited from the campus of Technische Uni-
versita¨t Darmstadt and tested individually in sessions of about 35 minutes. Again,
the majority were students and none of them understood or spoke Korean.
Stimuli and apparatus
The apparatus and the stimuli were the same as in experiment 2. However, both
the CSs and the USs were selected from the pool of 50 non-words on the basis of
individual baseline ratings made by each subject.
Design and Procedure
The experimental design and the procedure were identical to experiment 1 with the
exception that (instead of meaningful words from the BAWL) those nine non-words
with the highest and the lowest baseline ratings each were used as liked or disliked
USs, respectively.
Again, no subject was identified to be aware of the purpose of the study.
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6.3.2. Results
Evaluative conditioning
Mean baseline ratings of non-words that were used as liked and disliked USs were
+5.00 (SD = 1.82) and −5.83 (SD = 1.92), respectively. Mean evaluative ratings
of CSs before and after conditioning can be seen in figure 6.2.
A 2 (US valence) × 3 (phonological distraction) repeated-measures ANOVA re-
vealed a significant main effect of US valence on the pre-post evaluative rating
differences, F (1, 39) = 4.72; p < .05, confirming the overall EC effect. However, its
interaction with auditory distraction was not significant, F (2, 78) = 0.55; p = .58.
The type of phonological distraction also did not have a significant main effect on
the rating difference, F (2, 60) = 0.77; p = .47.
In addition, contrasts were computed within the phonological distraction condi-
tions. Paired t-tests revealed a significant EC effect within the silence condition,
t(39) = 1.90; p < .05; d = 0.40, but neither within the irrelevant speech condition,
t(39) = 1.26; p = .11; d = 0.25 nor within the articulatory suppression condition,
t(39) = 0.42; p = .34; d = 0.08.
Contingency memory
Mean recognition performance of stimulus pairings that were presented under dif-
ferent conditions of auditory distraction can be seen in table 6.2. Collapsed across
US valence, subjects correctly recognized 57.5% of the non-word pairings that were
learned in the silence, 51.3% of those learned under irrelevant speech, and 45.4%
of those in the articulatory suppression condition. A 2 (US valence) × 3 (phono-
logical distraction) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect
of phonological distraction on contingency awareness, F (2, 78) = 6.67; p < .005,
reflecting the monotonic decrease in recognition performance from silence over irrel-
evant speech to articulatory suppression. In addition, a significant main effect of US
valence was found, F (1, 78) = 18.19; p < .001, with the disliked-US pairings being
memorized better than the liked-US pairings. There was no significant interaction,
F (2, 78) = 2.09; p = .13.
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Figure 6.2.: Evaluative ratings of non-words that were paired with liked or disliked
non-words either in silence or under conditions of irrelevant speech or
articulatory suppression (experiment 2).
Contingency memory and evaluative conditioning
The impact of contingency awareness on EC was analyzed on an item level. To that
effect, the data were divided into those items that were recognized in the aware-
ness test and those that were not (see table 6.2). For aware items (370 items),
the mean rating difference of CSs that were paired with a disliked or liked US
were M = +0.47 (SD = 3.81) and M = +0.78 (SD = 3.92), respec-
tively. This difference, however, was not significant, t(77) = 0.56; p = .58 (two-
sample t-test). For the unaware items (350 items), the mean rating difference was
M = −0.53 (SD = 3.93) in case of disliked USs and M = +0.48 (SD = 4.12) in
case of liked USs. This difference was not significant, either, t(73) = 1.65; p = .10
(two-sample t-test).
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Table 6.2.: Contingency memory (in percent correct) and evaluative rating differ-
ences of non-recognized and recognized CS-US pairings in experiment 2
(standard deviations in parentheses).
Phonological disruption condition
silence irrelevant speech articulatory suppression
Contingency memory
disliked US 63.3% (48.4) 58.3% (49.5) 59.2% (49.4)
liked US 51.7% (50.2) 44.2% (49.9) 31.7% (46.7)
Evaluative rating differences (non-recognized pairings)
disliked US −0.73 (3.51) −0.70 (4.17) −0.18 (4.07)
liked US +1.09 (4.18) +0.40 (3.79) +0.12 (4.33)
Evaluative rating differences (recognized pairings)
disliked US +0.62 (4.26) +0.61 (3.66) +0.17 (3.46)
liked US +0.81 (4.39) +1.06 (4.09) +0.34 (2.75)
6.3.3. Discussion
Again, an overall evaluative conditioning effect was observed in experiment 2.
Though the critical interaction with phonological distraction was not significant,
both types of working memory disruptions, articulatory suppression and irrelevant
speech, appear to reduce evaluative learning.
Further, the working memory modulations go along with a systematic decrease
in contingency memory. As expected, CS-US recognition was best in the silence
condition and worst in the articulatory suppression condition. This implies that, in
line with the ‘phonological loop’ model, actively producing irrelevant speech leads
to even stronger disruptions in working memory than merely processing irrelevant
speech does. More importantly, however, we found an irrelevant speech effect on a
delayed recognition measure of memory in a non-serial pair-associate learning task.
Further, US valence again had a considerable impact on contingency memory. Repli-
cating the valence asymmetry effect from experiment 1, pairs involving individually
disliked non-words were recognized much better than those involving individually
liked non-words.
There was no difference in EC between recognized and non-recognized CS-US
pairings. Rather surprisingly, however, the conditioning effect within the silence
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condition appears to be more pronounced in unaware pairings which would be at
odds with earlier findings (Pleyers et al., 2007). This finding suggests that, while
working memory resources are necessary, the resulting contingency knowledge seems
to be less important in the acquisition of EC. In other word, EC can occur in the
absence of contingency awareness if sufficient working memory resources are available
during conditioning. However, the effect of working memory modulations on EC does
not appear to be robust enough since the critical interaction was not significant.
Therefore, we tried to replicate the effect of irrelevant speech on conditioning in a
third experiment with different phonological distraction conditions.
6.4. Experiment 3
In experiments 1 and 2, articulatory suppression was the distraction condition that
impaired EC most dramatically. One might wonder whether these impairments of
EC are actually due to reduced phonological working memory capacity or whether
it is the dual-task situation created by the articulatory suppression trials that is
responsible for the effect: In both previous experiments, subjects were required (a)
to learn the contingencies and (b) to articulate numbers during the respective tri-
als. To decide whether it is phonological disruption or the cognitive load produced
by the dual-task situation, a third experiment was conducted without including the
articulatory suppression condition. Instead, only passive phonological working mem-
ory disruption was produced. Different types of speech and non-speech background
sounds were played back in experiment 3 not requiring the participants to actively
engage in a secondary task. Thus, the participants’ cognitive load during condition-
ing is expected to be stressed less than in the previous experiments since (a) mere
passive auditory disruption is supposed to be less demanding than an active artic-
ulation task, and (b) subjects do not have to continuously monitor the instructing
text messages any longer. Furthermore, in order to enhance contingency memory,
we decided to make the pair-associate learning task easier by using fewer stimulus
pairings (only 2 pairings per US valence × disruption condition). For that reason,
more robust effects of EC than in experiment 2 are expected due to the availability
of more working memory resources.
The purpose of experiment 3 was to produce different levels of working memory
disruption during EC through the playback of three types of irrelevant sound that
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differed with respect to how speech-like they were and how much ‘changing-state’
information they contained: white noise, sinusoidally frequency-modulated (FM)
tones and speech. According to the O-OER model, the working memory disruption
produced by FM tones should be similar to that produced by speech because it
provides a comparable amount of ‘changing state’ information. The phonological
loop model, however, predicts that disruption by FM tones should more or less
resemble that of white noise, since both are not speech-like.
Thus, similar to experiment 2, the impact of different types of passive phonological
distraction on both contingency memory and evaluative learning was investigated by
presenting either white noise, FM tones or speech while the participant is required
to learn pairs of non-words. In contrast to the previous experiments, there should
be no difference in the cognitive load produced by different distraction trials since
the secondary articulation task was omitted.
6.4.1. Method
Participants
Another forty participants (20 female) with ages ranging between 18 and 55 years
(M = 24.1;SD = 6.7) were recruited from the campus of Technische Universita¨t
Darmstadt. The majority were students and none of them understood or spoke
Korean. Each participant was tested individually in a session of about 35 minutes
duration.
Stimuli and apparatus
An enlarged stimulus set of 100 non-words was used in the baseline rating phase in
order to obtain less variance in the initial CS ratings. Like in experiment 2, CSs and
USs were selected on the basis of the individual baseline ratings.
Now, three types of distraction sounds were used to manipulate the subjects’
ability to memorize the stimulus pairing during the acquisition phase (adopted from
K. Zimmer et al., 2008): white noise, intermittent FM tones (with a 1150-Hz center
frequency and a modulation depth of 850 Hz; modulated at a rate of 0.25 Hz and
interrupted by 300-ms gaps of silence every 700 ms) and the segment of free-running
speech from experiment 1 and 2. The sounds were presented at equal RMS levels
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corresponding to approximately 63 dB SPL. Onsets and offsets of all sounds were
smoothed using 10-ms rise and fall times.
The apparatus was the same as in experiments 1 and 2.
Design and procedure
The design was the same as in the previous experiments. The procedure was identi-
cal expect for the following changes: Participants evaluated a total of 100 non-words
in the baseline and test phase. In the acquisition phase, 12 pairings consisting of a
neutral and either liked or disliked non-words (instead of 18 pairings as in the previ-
ous experiments) were presented 6 times each in randomized order while - together
with 4 pairings each - either white noise, FM-tones or speech was played back. Thus
two pairings of each US valence were combined with a particular distraction sound,
and a total of 72 trials was presented.
According to the answers on the final sheet of paper, again, no subject was iden-
tified to be aware of the purpose of the study.
6.4.2. Results
Evaluative conditioning
Mean baseline ratings of liked and disliked USs were 6.60(SD = 2.05) and
−7.39(SD = 1.61), respectively. Mean evaluative ratings of CS non-words before
and after conditioning can be seen in figure 6.3. On a descriptive level, evaluative
learning was found for non-word pairings that were presented either together with
white noise or FM-tones, but not for those presented together with irrelevant speech.
A 2 (US valence) × 3 (phonological distraction) repeated-measures ANOVA on the
pre-post evaluative rating differences revealed a significant main effect of US valence,
F (1, 39) = 11.00;< .01, again confirming the overall EC effect. More importantly,
a significant interaction between US valence and phonological distraction was found,
F (2, 78) = 3.58, p < .05, confirming the impact of the working memory modulations
(i.e. the irrelevant sound conditions) on EC. There was no main effect of phonological
distraction on the evaluative rating differences, F (2, 78) = 0.23; p = .80.
Evaluative conditioning effects were further investigated within each auditory dis-
traction condition by means of paired t-tests. Pre-post evaluative rating shifts dif-
fered significantly when contrasting CSs that were paired with liked or disliked USs
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Figure 6.3.: Evaluative ratings of non-words that were paired with liked or disliked
non-words under different irrelevant sound conditions (experiment 3).
within the noise condition, t(39) = 2.52; p < .01; d = 0.61, and within the FM
tones condition, t(39) = 3.72; p < .001; d = 0.75, but there was no significant EC
effect within the irrelevant speech condition, t(39) = 0.57; p = .29; d = 0.12.
Contingency memory
Contingency recognition data can be seen in table 6.3. On average, subjects cor-
rectly recognized 70.0% of the non-word pairings in the noise condition, 65.0%
in the tones condition, and 51.2% in the speech condition. A 2 (US valence) ×
3 (phonological distraction) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
pair recognition performance confirms the main effect of phonological distraction,
F (2, 78) = 6.67; p < .01, showing that working memory was successfully disrupted
(by irrelevant speech) during the acquisition. There was neither a significant main
effect of US valence on recognition performance, F (1, 39) = 0.86; p = .36, nor an
interaction with phonological distraction, F (2, 78) = 0.26; p = .77.
6.4 Experiment 3 107
Table 6.3.: Contingency memory (in percent correct) and evaluative rating differ-
ences for recognized and non-recognized pairings in experiment 3 (stan-
dard deviations in parentheses).
Phonological disruption condition
white noise FM tones irrelevant speech
Contingency memory
disliked US 71.2% (45.4) 65.0% (48.0) 55.0% (50.1)
liked US 68.7% (46.6) 65.0% (48.0) 47.5% (50.3)
Evaluative rating differences (non-recognized pairings)
disliked US −0.13 (2.88) −0.89 (3.48) −1.11 (3.51)
liked US −0.08 (2.81) +0.46 (4.25) +0.90 (2.71)
Evaluative rating differences (recognized pairings)
disliked US −1.23 (3.29) −1.31 (3.42) +0.75 (3.26)
liked US +0.95 (3.47) +1.31 (3.17) −0.55 (3.16)
Contingency memory and evaluative conditioning
Again, the data were split into those items that were recognized in the aware-
ness test and those that were not (see table 6.3). For aware items (298 items),
the mean rating difference of CSs that were paired with a disliked or liked US was
M = −0.78 (SD = 3.12) and M = +0.40 (SD = 2.70), respectively.
This difference, however, failed to reach statistical significance, t(77) = 1.78; :
p = .08. For the unaware items (182 items), the mean rating difference was
M = −0.57 (SD = 2.73) in case of disliked USs and M = 0.69 (SD = 1.98)
in case of liked USs. This difference was significant, t(66) = 2.18; p < .05.
6.4.3. Discussion
The results of experiment 3 again demonstrate successful evaluative learning with
verbal non-word stimuli. More importantly, phonological distraction during the ac-
quisition phase modulated the magnitude of EC. While clear conditioning effects
were found when non-speech sounds (FM tones, white noise) were played back during
the encoding of the CS-US pairs, the concurrent presentation of speech practically
abolished EC. Since irrelevant background speech is known to consume working
memory resources, this result suggests that working memory plays a crucial role
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during the acquisition of EC.
The type of phonological distraction also reduced the degree of contingency knowl-
edge. Listening to irrelevant speech impaired memorizing the CS-US pairs more than
listening to FM tones which in turn reduced contingency knowledge more than white
noise did. Thus contingency awareness was successfully modulated via phonologi-
cal disruption of working memory in experiment 3. Different degrees of contingency
memory were experimentally induced and, more importantly, the working memory
modulations also affected evaluative learning.
However, since an increase in contingency knowledge did not go along with
stronger EC effects (rather the opposite seems to occur), the data suggest that the
resulting contingency knowledge (measured explicitly in a post-acquisition recogni-
tion test) is less critical for EC to occur than the availability of working memory
resources during the acquisition.
6.5. General Discussion
The present study demonstrates reliable EC effects in a verbal conditioning paradigm
with non-words serving as the CSs and either meaningful words or individually pre-
rated non-words serving as the USs. The data thus document the robustness of EC
even with rather unobtrusive non-word USs.
Phonological distraction was shown to interfere with the acquisition of EC.
Whereas clear EC effects were observed for CS-US pairings that were presented
in silence, or during the playback of noise or FM tones, EC diminished when par-
ticipants were producing (in experiments 1 and 2) or listening to irrelevant speech
(in experiment 3). This suggests that, in addition to attentional resources (Field &
Moore, 2005; Pleyers et al., 2009), working memory capacity plays a crucial role in
the acquisition of EC. Occupying working memory with irrelevant materials - as did
diverting the focus of attention - impaired the acquisition of EC. This highlights
the importance of the availability of cognitive resources during conditioning. Since
EC appears to be sensitive to working memory modulations, the data challenge
the assumption of evaluative learning being a mere referential automatic process
which should be independent of higher-order cognitive processing (Baeyens, Eelen,
Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992; Baeyens & De Houwer, 1995; Baeyens, Eelen, &
Crombez, 1995; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b). Rather, the present data are in line
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with single-process models of associative learning or propositional accounts claiming
that EC and classical conditioning are both sensitive to the availability of attentional
resources or contingency memory (e.g. Dawson & Furedy, 1976; De Houwer, 2007;
Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Admittedly, due to its relationship to au-
ditory memory processes, the working memory effect on conditioning still appears
to be confined to stimuli that can be encoded phonologically, i.e. to a verbal con-
ditioning paradigm (as in C. K. Staats & Staats, 1957; A. W. Staats & Staats,
1958). Since there are studies, however, demonstrating disruption of visual or spa-
tial short-term memory performance by irrelevant visual stimuli (i.e. the ‘irrelevant
pictures’ effect, see H. D. Zimmer & Speiser, 2002), future research might be able
to find analogous effects of visual working memory distraction in the picture-picture
paradigm of EC (Levey & Martin, 1975).
Auditory distraction further impaired contingency knowledge. Stimulus pairings
presented during phonological distraction (irrelevant speech or articulatory suppres-
sion) were recognized to a lesser extent in a final test than those pairs that were pre-
sented in silence, or together with white noise or FM tones. In addition to attentional
distraction (Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b; Field & Moore,
2005; Pleyers et al., 2009) and subliminal presentations of USs (e.g. De Houwer
et al., 1994, 1997; Field & Moore, 2005), working memory disruptions represents
yet another way to modulate contingency knowledge. Rather than generally di-
verting the subjects’ attention by engaging them in secondary tasks, this method
has the advantage of being suited to manipulate awareness on an item-by-item basis
within subjects. There are different possible explanations as to how phonological dis-
traction might affect contingency knowledge in a conditioning paradigm. Whereas
the ‘phonological loop’ account predicts working memory disturbance depending on
how speech-like the distracting sound is, the O-OER model refers to the amount of
‘changing state’ information provided by a particular sound. The results of experi-
ment 3 are rather in line with the predictions of the phonological loop model because
the small magnitude of disruption produced by FM tones is comparable to that pro-
duced by noise rather than by irrelevant speech. In addition, articulatory suppression
consistently produced greater impairment of contingency knowledge than did irrele-
vant speech. Thus, the data of experiments 1 and 2 are in favor of the phonological
loop model as well to account for the effect of working memory disturbance in an
associative learning task.
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In contrast to other studies, we did not find a clear relationship between contin-
gency knowledge and EC. Though both EC and contingency memory were dimin-
ished with increasing phonological distraction, the EC effect was not restricted to
those CS-US pairings that were finally recognized. At this point, the data seem to
deviate from earlier findings that EC only emerges for those CS-US pairs that a
participant is aware of (e.g. Pleyers et al., 2007, 2009; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009).
However, the present finding is in line with several other studies showing EC in
the absence of contingency awareness (Baeyens et al., 1990; Dickinson & Brown,
2007; Field & Moore, 2005; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b; Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000;
Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005; Walther & Nagengast, 2006). One might argue that the
post-acquisition recognition measure was just not sensitive enough to detect the
modulations of contingency knowledge that were produced by phonological disrup-
tion during the acquisition. Subjects’ contingency knowledge in the acquisition phase
might deviate from that measured in the final recognition test. The present data,
however, suggest that memory at the time of acquisition (i.e. working memory),
rather than post-acquisition contingency knowledge is crucial for EC to occur. Such
a discrepancy between working memory during conditioning and contingency mem-
ory after conditioning could offer an explanation for the inconsistent results obtained
with respect to the role of contingency awareness (e.g. Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001b;
Pleyers et al., 2007). The present results indicate that EC depends on the availability
of working memory resources during but not necessarily on a resulting (long-term)
memory of the contingencies. In other words, the (temporary) processing of the CS-
US pairings in working memory but not a transfer into long-term memory seem to
be crucial for the acquisition of EC.
To sum up, the present study showed phonological disruption (i.e. articulatory
suppression and the irrelevant speech effect) to be a useful method for studying the
role of working memory in EC. In contrast to earlier studies (e.g. using attention-
diverting secondary tasks), cognitive resources were manipulated within the same
subject. The method thus appears suitable to elicit different degrees of contingency
memory within subjects, and is presumably less transparent to participants than
other manipulations that, for instance, explicitly redirect attention. The results sug-
gest that EC occurs independently of contingency knowledge in terms of the resulting
pair-recognition memory. Working memory resources available during conditioning,
however, reliably affected the acquisition of EC. Both the production and the pro-
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cessing of irrelevant speech but not concurrently presented non-speech sounds (like
FM tones) significantly impaired the acquisition of new evaluative responses. In
other words, irrelevant speech interferes with evaluative learning.
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Abstract
An experiment is reported studying the impact of objective contingency and con-
tingency judgments on cross-modal evaluative conditioning. Both contingency judg-
ments and evaluative responses were measured after a contingency learning task in
which previously neutral sounds served as either weak or strong predictors of af-
fective pictures. Experimental manipulations of contingency and US density were
shown to affect contingency judgments. Stronger contingencies were perceived with
high contingency and with low US density. The contingency learning task also pro-
duced a reliable evaluative conditioning effect. The magnitude of this effect was
influenced by an interaction of statistical contingency and US density. Furthermore,
the magnitude of evaluative conditioning was correlated with the subjective contin-
gency judgments. Taken together, the results imply that propositional knowledge
about the CS-US relationship, as reflected in contingency judgments, moderates
evaluative learning. The data are discussed with respect to different accounts of
evaluative conditioning.
Keywords: evaluative conditioning, contingency learning, outcome density effect, US
density, contingency judgments, contingency awareness, associative learning, propo-
sitional learning
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7.1. Does evaluative learning rely on the perception
of contingency? Manipulating contingency and
US density during evaluative conditioning
Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to an increase or decrease in the liking of a stim-
ulus (the conditioned stimulus, CS) that results from pairing it with a positive or
negative stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus, US), respectively (e.g. De Houwer,
Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). EC can thus be accounted as a form of Pavlovian con-
ditioning affecting evaluative responses rather than overt behavior or physiological
responses, and it is considered to be an important mechanism to account for the
acquisition and change of preferences (De Houwer, 2007). In a prototypical exper-
iment, CSs are being evaluated with respect to subjective liking before and after
conditioning (Levey & Martin, 1975; Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990).
In contrast to classical Pavlovian conditioning (e.g. Rescorla, 1968), however,
EC appears to be insensitive to modulations of the statistical contingency between
the CS and the US, and it has been shown to occur even in the absence of con-
tingency (Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 1993). A recent meta-analysis reported no
effect of additional CS-only or US-only trials (which are reducing contingency) on
EC and no difference in the effect sizes of EC between perfect and partial contin-
gency (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). This is in line
with dual-process accounts suggesting that only expectancy learning requires the
CS to statistically predict the US, whereas EC relies on a mere referential, simple
Hebbian learning system where spatial or temporal contiguity between the CS and
the US should be sufficient (e.g. Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992;
Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Eelen, 2001). However, evidence for EC to
occur independently of the CS-US contingency is extremely limited, yet (Hofmann
et al., 2010).
Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate on whether EC requires the subject’s
awareness of the CS-US relationship. Accounts of EC differ with respect to the
assumed role of contingency awareness (e.g. Baeyens et al., 1992; De Houwer, 2007),
and the empirical results thereon are rather ambiguous. Whereas some studies found
EC to occur independently of (Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990) and even
in the absence of contingency awareness (e.g. Dickinson & Brown, 2007; Fulcher
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& Hammerl, 2001; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005), others found EC to be restricted to
contingency-aware participants and to pairings that the participant is aware of (e.g.
Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox, 2007; Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt,
2007; Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Luminet, 2009; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Stahl,
Unkelbach, & Corneille, 2009; Wardle, Mitchell, & Lovibond, 2007). Though a recent
meta-analysis reported contingency awareness to be the most potent moderator
variable in EC (it increases with contingency awareness), small but reliable EC
effects have also been identified in the absence of contingency awareness (Hofmann
et al., 2010).
There has been a great deal of criticism concerning the reliability and sensitivity
of measures of contingency awareness going beyond the scope of this discussion
(see Shanks & St. John, 1994; Field, 2000; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). Typically,
contingency awareness is measured by means of a forced-choice recognition test after
conditioning asking the participant to identify the respective US (or its valence)
that had been paired with a particular CS (Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990;
Walther & Nagengast, 2006; Stahl et al., 2009). Thus, contingency awareness refers
to the subject’s knowledge about the fact that CS and US have been paired (i.e.
contiguity) rather than to the subject’s idea of how reliably the CS predicts the US
(contingency).
By contrast, participants in a contingency learning task judge either the strength
or the likelihood of the relationship between a potential cue (or response) and an
outcome after having received some information about the co-occurrences of the cue
and the outcome (e.g. Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Dickinson,
Shanks, & Evenden, 1984). This information is provided by the frequencies of the
four events defined by the presence or absence of the cue and the outcome (see
table 7.1).
A common objective measure of statistical contingency is ∆P which refers to the
difference between the conditional probability of the outcome given the cue and the
conditional probability of the outcome in the absence of the cue (equation 7.1; see
Allan, 1980).
∆P =
a
a+ b
− c
c+ d
(7.1)
Though different accounts of EC differ in terms of their predictions about the role
of both objective contingency and contingency awareness, most of them are relatively
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Table 7.1.: A 2 × 2 matrix representing the four types of events in contingency
learning (corresponding events in a conditioning setting are written in
parentheses). The frequencies of the four possible combinations are rep-
resented by the letters a, b, c, and d.
Outcome present (US) Outcome absent (¬US)
Cue present (CS) a (contiguity) b (CS-only)
Cue absent (¬CS) c (US-only) d
mute with respect to the appraisal of CS-US contingency (contingency judgments).
Association-formation models assume EC to be affected mainly by the number of
CS-US pairings rather than by CS-US contingency (e.g. Walther, 2002). According
to the referential account (Baeyens et al., 1992), for instance, EC is supposed to
rely on automatic processes which should not depend on awareness at all, whether
it refers to stimulus contiguity or contingency (similar predictions are made by the
holistic account Martin & Levey, 1978). Others assume EC to be a function of either
the salience of the CS (implicit misattribution account; Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009)
or that of features shared by the CS and the US (concept categorization account;
Davey, 1994a) which is supposed to be moderated by awareness of the stimuli.
There is, however, no reason to assume that awareness of contingencies should make
those features more salient than awareness of contiguities. Finally, according to the
propositional account, EC is expected to require awareness of the CS-US relationship
(De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005; De Houwer, 2007, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer,
& Lovibond, 2009). Strictly spoken, learning should result from the formation and
evaluation of propositional knowledge about the contingencies. EC is thus expected
to vary with any variable that fosters the acquisition of contingency knowledge,
e.g. objective contingency. Therefore, this model seems to be incompatible with the
finding of EC to occur independently of contingency (e.g. Baeyens et al., 1993).
However, it is possible that EC sometimes results from propositions about the co-
occurrences of the CS and the US (contiguity knowledge) and does not necessarily
require propositional knowledge about the contingency (Hofmann et al., 2010). In
order to test whether EC is sensitive to the appraisal of statistical contingency, the
present study intends to actively manipulate the subjects’ conscious beliefs (i.e. their
contingency judgments).
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For this purpose, it is intended to manipulate contingency judgments indepen-
dently of ∆P . Under optimal conditions subjects’ propositional knowledge should
reflect ∆P quite well (De Houwer, 2007; Shanks, 1995). However, contingency judg-
ments are known to be influenced by a number of factors irrelevant to contingency, as
well (Allan, 1993; Shanks, 1995). Particularly, stronger contingency relationships are
perceived with shorter gaps between the cause and the outcome (Shanks, Pearson,
& Dickinson, 1989) and with longer inter-trial intervals (Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson,
& Kornbrot, 2005; Msetfi, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007). Further, contingency judg-
ments reflect the density of outcomes (i.e. the number of outcome trials divided by
the total number of trials). With a few exceptions (e.g. Wasserman, Elek, Chat-
losh, & Baker, 1993), contingency judgments tend to increase with outcome density
independently of ∆P (e.g. Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Al-
lan, Siegel, & Hannah, 2007; Dickinson et al., 1984; Valle´e-Tourangeau, Murphy, &
Baker, 2005). Recently, the use of signal-detection theory on contingency learning
demonstrated that outcome density has an effect on the response tendency (i.e. the
probability of ’strong-contingency’ responses) rather than on the ability to judge the
contingency relationship (Allan, Siegel, & Tangen, 2005; Allan, Hannah, Crump, &
Siegel, 2008). Subjects reported stronger contingencies in case of high outcome den-
sity, but the slopes of the psychometric functions remained unaffected. The point
of subjective equality (the objective contingency at which subjects report strong
and weak contingencies equally often) was about .05 lower on the ∆P -scale when
outcome density was .7 than when it was .3 (at least in the psychometric func-
tions of 3 of 4 participants, see figure 8 in Allan et al., 2008). Thus the response
tendency rather than the sensitivity to contingency information seems to increase
with outcome density. Nevertheless, since both the response bias and the sensitivity
are supposed to influence the contingency appraisal, outcome density modulations
appear to be a useful approach to manipulate the propositional knowledge about
contingencies during EC.
The present study intends to show cross-modal EC with environmental sounds
as CSs and pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) as USs in a paradigm that simultaneously requires the
subject to judge the CS-US contingencies. In order to manipulate the perceived
contingency independently of ∆P , the density of US trials was varied. With con-
stant ∆P , subjects are supposed to perceive a stronger contingency when US density
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increases. Additionally, contingency judgments are expected to reflect objective con-
tingency.
If EC results from the same processes that are involved in expectancy learning
(e.g. Rescorla, 1988), then the magnitude of EC should be a function of ∆P . By
contrast, if merely referential processes cause EC, then only contiguity (which was
held constant in the present study) but neither the contingency nor subjective beliefs
(modulated by US density) are expected to affect EC (e.g. Baeyens et al., 1992).
According to the propositional account, EC should basically depend on the acquired
knowledge concerning the CS-US relationship, rather than on objective values of
contingency (De Houwer, 2007). EC is assumed to occur only in contingency-aware
subjects, and its magnitude is expected to reflect the knowledge about either the
co-occurrences (i.e. the level of contingency awareness) or the statistical contingency
(i.e. contingency judgments). If EC is sensitive to the appraisal of contingency, then
it should be affected by manipulations of both US density and ∆P because both are
expected to affect the contingency judgment.
7.2. Method
7.2.1. Participants
31 (14 female) participants with a median age of 21 years (ranging from 19 to 26)
were recruited at the campus of Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt. The majority of
them were undergraduate students not majoring in psychology. They participated
in individual experimental sessions of about 45 minutes and were compensated with
e8.
7.2.2. Materials and apparatus
CSs were selected according to individual pleasure ratings from a set of 32 short nat-
ural monophonically recorded sounds, depicting a great variety of acoustical events
like animal voices (e.g. of birds, bees, or a horse), human body noises (e.g. a laugh
or a clap), musical instruments (e.g. a cymbal or a fanfare horn), video-game-type
sounds or other noises (e.g. a hammer or water). Sounds were played back at equal
RMS levels (63 dB SPL) and the duration varied between 200 and 350 ms. Eight
IAPS pictures (Lang et al., 2008) with positive (nos. 4220, 7580, 7480, 8200) or
7.2 Method 123
negative (nos. 1111, 3064, 9410, 9571) valence served as liked and disliked USs,
respectively.
The experiment was run in a single-walled sound-attenuated listening room (IAC).
Visual stimuli were displayed on a 19” TFT monitor (Philips) and the sounds were
presented via headphones (Beyerdynamics DT-990). Stimulus presentations and re-
sponse measurements were controlled by a Matlab program, using the Psychophysics
Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
7.2.3. Experimental design
The standard EC paradigm was modified in order to allow simultaneous CS-US
contingency learning. In contrast to contingency learning which is basically a matter
of only two events (the cue and the outcome), multiple cues and outcomes (i.e. CSs
and USs) were presented in a differential conditioning procedure. Since there is
no easy way with multiple contingencies to assign a no-event (d in table 6.1) to a
particular CS-US pairing without introducing additional context cues, the frequency
of the absence of both CSi and USi was defined as the total number trials within the
conditioning block (n) less those involving CSi or USi. Thus contingency and US
density of CSi − USi were defined according to equations 7.2 and 7.3, respectively.
∆PCSiUSi =
ai
ai + bi
− ci
n− ai − bi (7.2)
P (USi) =
ai + ci
n
(7.3)
A 2×2×2 design was implemented with US valence, contingency and US density
as independent variables. Two learning blocks were created that differed in the level
of contingency. US density and US valence varied between the four stimulus pairings
presented within a block (compare table 7.2). Dependent measures were contingency
recognition, contingency judgments and evaluative responses.
7.2.4. Procedure
In the baseline phase, the 32 sounds were rated on a 21-category scale (ranging
from −10 to +10) with respect to subjective liking or disliking. Based on these
ratings, those eight sounds rated closest to zero were selected to be used as CSs in
the subsequent phases. Eight CS-US pairings were created by randomly assigning
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Table 7.2.: The values of b, c and d in the contingency matrix for the eight CS-
US pairings and the resulting values of ∆P , US density and CS density
within the two learning blocks.
Block b c d ∆P US density CS density US valence
1 8 3 94 low (.50) low (.11) .15 positive
8 3 94 low (.50) low (.11) .15 negative
3 25 77 low (.50) high (.30) .11 positive
3 25 77 low (.50) high (.30) .11 negative
2 3 0 62 high (.75) low (.12) .16 positive
3 0 62 high (.75) low (.12) .16 negative
0 16 49 high (.75) high (.34) .12 positive
0 16 49 high (.75) high (.34) .12 negative
Note: b = number of CS-only trial ; c = number of US-only trial; d = number of trial
belonging to a different pairing in the same block; a (the number of CS-US trials) was 9
in all conditions. The total number of trials was 114 in block 1, 74 in block 2
each neutral sound to either a positive or negative US (picture). The main part of
the experiment consisted of two separated learning blocks. The task required the
subject to simultaneously learn the contingency of four CS-US pairings. In each
block, two pairs with a positive US and two pairs with a negative US were presented
nine times each in a randomized order. Statistical contingency was low (∆P = .5)
in block 1 and high (∆P = .75) in block 2, and it was held constant across the four
stimulus pairs within a block. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across
participants. US density varied within the blocks: Two USs were presented with high
density (in 10% of the trials each), and two USs were presented with low density
(in 30% of the trials each). Note that no US was presented in the remaining 20%
of trials. In order to modulate contingency and US density, the values of b and c in
the contingency matrix were varied (see table 6.2 for the exact frequencies). Since
the frequency of d was derived from those trials belonging to a different pairing
(see above), there were no trials without any stimulus. A variable trace conditioning
procedure was used in which the US was always displayed 0.5 s after the onset of
the CS. The US was displayed for 0.5 s and the inter-trial interval was 1 s. Prior to
the first learning block, participants were given the following instruction (translated
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from German):
Welcome to our study!
We are interested in how good people are in learning that sounds predict
certain events. We first ask you rate each stimulus spontaneously according
to how pleasant or unpleasant it sounds by means of a scale that will appear
on the screen. The scale ranges from -10 (very unpleasant) through 0 (neu-
tral) to +10 (very pleasant). Then, several noises and pictures will appear
repeatedly. Particular noises will always predict certain pictures more or
less reliably. You will observe several instances of four different events:
(1) the sound is presented prior to the picture
(2) the sound is presented without the picture
(3) the picture appears without the sound
(4) neither the [particular] sound nor the [particular] picture appears
Your task is to figure out how reliably each picture can be predicted by
a particular sound. After a couple of trials, we will ask you to identify
each sound-picture pairing and to judge the strength of its relationship by
means of a rating scale ranging from 0 (no contingency) to 100 (strong
contingency). A strong contingency means that most of the time you hear
the sound you also see the picture, and most of the time you don’t hear the
sound you also do not see the picture. A weak contingency means that the
picture appears in the presence of the sound as often as it appears in the
absence of the sound.
Do you have any questions?
After each block, evaluative responses, contingency awareness, and contingency
judgments were measured with respect to the stimuli presented in the block. Short
additional instructions were given prior to each task. First, the pleasantness of each
sound was rated on the same 21-category scale as used in the baseline rating phase
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(evaluative response). Second, the subject had to select the picture which had been
paired with the particular sound among all four pictures that were presented in
the block (contingency awareness). Similar to the procedure developed by Baeyens,
Eelen, and Van den Bergh (1990), a subject was classified as aware of a pairing
if either the correct picture (the US) or a different picture of the same valence as
the US was selected (q.v. Davey, 1994b). Third, participants were asked to judge
the contingency between the sound and the picture by means of a 21-category scale
ranging from 0 (no contingency) to 100 (perfect contingency).
7.3. Results
For all statistical tests, a p-value of less than .05 was accepted as significant.
7.3.1. Contingency awareness
The participants correctly recognized 94.4% of the CS-US pairings. A different pic-
ture with the same valence as the US was selected in additional 3.1% of the cases.
Thus, subjects were clearly unaware only with respect to 2.5% of the pairings. Due
to the low percentage of unawareness, the data were collapsed across contingency-
aware and contingency-unaware items for the analysis of contingency judgments.
7.3.2. Contingency judgments
Figure 7.1 illustrates the contingency judgments of CS-US pairings with positive and
negative USs as a function of ∆P and US density. The mean CS-US contingency
judgment was 50.2 (SD = 29.1) in the low-contingency block and 61.1 (SD = 28.5)
in the high-contingency block. On average, the contingency of pairings with low and
high US density was judged 59.4 (SD = 29.3) and 51.8 (SD = 28.8), respectively. A
2 (US density) × 2 (contingency) × 2 (US valence) repeated-measures ANOVA on
the contingency judgments revealed two significant main effects, one for contingency,
F (1, 30) = 11.22; p < .01, and one for US density, P (1, 30) = 4.46; p < .05. There
was no main effect of US valence, F (1, 30) = 1.90; p = .18, and there were no
significant interactions, all Fs < 1.
To get an idea of whether the effects of US density on the contingency judgments
reflect changes in the sensitivity to contingency information or a shift in the response
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Figure 7.1.: Contingency judgments of CS-US pairings as a function of US density
and contingency.
criterion, the pooled data were further analyzed by treating them according to the
rating paradigm in a signal-detection experiment (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).
High-contingency pairings (∆P = .75) served as signal trials and low-contingency
pairings (∆P = .5) served as noise trials. The sensitivity to contingency information
(d′) and the response criterion (c) were computed for each category on the contin-
gency rating scale2 from the z-scores of the probabilities of hits and false alarms
according to equation 7.4 and 7.5 (see Allan et al., 2005, for some details).
d′ =
µ.75 − µ.5
σ
= z(yes|∆P = .75)− z(yes|∆P = .5) (7.4)
2Contingency judgments can be interpreted as confidence ratings for perceiving high contingency
(greater contingency judgments indicate a higher certainty that the pairing has been presented
with high contingency). In order to compute hit rates and false alarm rates, the ratings were
grouped into categories (0-15, 20-35, 40-55, 60-75, 80-100). Any response falling into a given
category or a higher (stricter) one was defined as a yes response (meaning ’high contingency’)
and any response in a less strict category was defined as a no response (’low contingency’). A
hit was defined as a yes-response to a high-contingency pairing and a false alarm was defined
as a yes-response to a low-contingency pairing.
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c =
z(yes|∆P = .75) + z(yes|∆P = .5)
−2 (7.5)
Across categories, the analysis revealed a mean sensitivity of d′ = 0.37 for pairings
with low US density and d′ = 0.43 for those with high US density. The response
criteria are shown in table 7.3. Responses were consistently more liberal for low US
density pairings (c = −0.40) than for high US density pairings (c = −0.12).
Table 7.3.: Response criteria c for four arbitrary category boundaries along the (0-
100) contingency rating scale.
yes-response low US density high US density
≥ 20 -1.26 -0.98
≥ 40 -0.65 -0.47
≥ 60 -0.15 0.12
≥ 80 0.44 0.84
7.3.3. Evaluative Ratings
Mean evaluative ratings of CSs before and after conditioning are depicted in fig-
ure 7.2. Evaluative rating differences were computed by subtracting the evalua-
tive ratings in the baseline phase from those obtained after the respective contin-
gency learning block. The grand mean of the evaluative rating shifts for sounds
that were paired with positive or negative pictures was 0.57(SD = 3.61) and
−1.64(SD = 3.63), respectively.
A 2 (US density) × 2 (contingency) × 2 (US valence) ANOVA confirmed the
overall EC effect by revealing a significant main effect of US valence on the evaluative
rating differences, F (1, 30) = 11.62; p < .01. Furthermore, there was a significant
three-way interaction between US valence, contingency and US density, F (1, 30) =
6.41; p < .05, implying that the effects of US density on EC differ between conditions
with low and high contingency (see figure 7.2). The ANOVA revealed no main effects
of contingency and US density, and no significant two-way interaction, all Fs < 1.
Additional two-way ANOVAs revealed a marginally significant US valence × US
density interaction in the low-contingency block, F (1, 30) = 3.34; p = .08, but not
in the high-contingency block, F (1, 30) = 1.92; p = .18. There were significant main
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Figure 7.2.: Evaluative ratings in the baseline phase (pre) and after conditioning
(post) as a function of US density and contingency.
effects of US valence in both blocks, F (1, 30) = 8.70; p < .01 and F (1, 30) = 6.78; p <
.05, respectively.
7.3.4. Relation between contingency judgments and EC
The absolute value of the EC effect was computed individually for each stimulus pair
and participant by multiplying the evaluative rating difference with the respective
valence index (−1 for negative USs, +1 for positive USs). The eight correlations
between the contingency judgments and the EC scores computed for each US va-
lence × contingency × US density condition were significantly greater than zero,
r¯ = .15; t(7) = 2.03; p < .05. Since correlations computed across subjects might
reflect effects of individual response biases (e.g. a proclivity towards high contin-
gency judgments going along with a tendency to assign extreme evaluative ratings),
additional correlations were computed for each subject, where between-subjects dif-
ferences cannot contribute to generating spurious effects. These correlations be-
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tween EC and contingency judgments were also significantly different from zero,
r¯ = .16; t(30) = 2.16; p < .05.
In order to compare the magnitude of EC for low and high perceived contingen-
cies, the data were split along the median of the contingency judgments (60). The
EC effect was found to be significantly greater in the upper half of the perceived-
contingency continuum (MEC = 1.62;SD = 4.02) compared to its lower half
(MEC = 0.58;SD = 3.17), t(123) = 2.50; p < .05.
7.4. Discussion
The aim of the reported experiment was to show whether EC depends on objective
contingency and/or propositional knowledge about contingencies which was manipu-
lated via US density. The modified conditioning paradigm produced an overall effect
of EC: The liking of sounds that were paired with positive pictures increased and
the liking sounds that were paired with negative pictures decreased.
Formerly, EC has been demonstrated within a variety of stimulus modalities, in-
cluding verbal (Staats & Staats, 1957), visual (Hammerl & Grabitz, 1993), haptic
(Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000), or flavor stimuli (Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, &
Crombez, 1990). The auditory modality, however, has been neglected so far. Though
a few studies found cross-modal EC with music as the US (e.g. Eifert, Craill, Carey,
& O’Connor, 1988), the authors are not aware of any study demonstrating changes
in the liking of auditory CSs. The present results thus show that, in addition to the
visual, haptic, or flavor perception of the CS, EC can also be demonstrated quite
reliably with auditory CSs. Furthermore, the data lend evidence to cross-modal
EC. The conceptual categorization account, for instance, assumes EC to result from
perceiving common features in the CS and the US which become salient during con-
ditioning and should thus diminish when using different stimulus modalities (Davey,
1994a; Field & Davey, 1999). Similarly, according to the implicit misattribution ac-
count, dissimilar CSs and USs should make an affective transfer unlikely (Jones et
al., 2009). The robustness of the affective transfers in the present cross-modal set-
ting within and across learning blocks challenges both accounts, and is in line with
Hofmann et al.’s (2010) conclusion that EC is independent of whether CS and US
match in terms of stimulus modality.
Due to the instructions to learn the contingencies, subjects were aware of the great
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majority of stimulus pairings, and the study thus replicates the occurrence of EC in
contingency-aware subjects (e.g. Dawson et al., 2007; Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl et
al., 2009). Since subjects were unaware only with respect to a few stimulus pairings,
the data cannot tell us anything about unaware EC, but they are inconsistent with
the occasionally reported finding that explicitly inducing contingency awareness
eliminates (or reverses) EC (Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005).
In aware participants, however, the appraisal of the contingency might vary between
the different conditioning procedures used - maybe due to the specific instructions
- and partially account for the divergent results obtained in previous studies.
The subjective appraisal of contingency was the main focus in the present study.
As expected, contingency judgments varied as a function of ∆P . CS-US contin-
gency was clearly judged higher (about 11% on the contingency scale) in the
high-contingency block compared to the low-contingency block. Thus, participants
learned to discriminate the contingencies with four contingency relations being
judged simultaneously within the same learning block (the effects were only slightly
smaller compared to other studies, e.g. Allan et al., 2007, figure 1, for an instance
with the same values of ∆P ). It is obvious that this makes contingency ratings
more complex than a task with only one cue and one outcome. Nevertheless, though
subjects were clearly sensitive to variations in ∆P , the contingency judgments also
varied with the density of US presentations. Greater contingency was perceived
when the USs occurred with low density than when they occurred with high density
(about 7.5% difference on the contingency scale). This effect is rather unusual for
both cue-outcome and action-outcome contingency learning tasks where higher out-
come density is typically accompanied with higher contingency judgments (compare
e.g. Allan, 1993; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Dickinson et al., 1984). In the present
multiple-contingency learning task, high US density was achieved by dramatically
increasing the number of US-only trials, and by slightly decreasing the number of
CS-only trials (compare table 7.2; the indirect modulations in the frequency of d-
trials are supposed to be less salient). Thus, subjects might particularly have noticed
the great number of US-only trials in high US-density pairings, and have underesti-
mated the contingency due to the fact that those salient US-only trials, according to
the instructions, indicate low contingency. However, similar reversed outcome den-
sity effects were found in the action-outcome tasks used by Wasserman, Chatlosh,
and Neunaber (1983) and Wasserman et al. (1993). For several instances of ∆P ,
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the authors reported less extreme (positive and negative) contingency judgments
with increasing outcome density. Valle´e-Tourangeau et al. (2005), however, failed
to replicate this effect when the confounded time lag between the response and the
outcome (temporal contiguity) was held constant. Since temporal contiguity (the
SOA between the sound and the picture) varied only with CS duration and was not
confounded with US density in the present study, the effect might be more than an
artifact in contingency learning3.
Signal detection analyses demonstrate that US density manipulations primarily
affected the response bias. Particularly, there was a tendency to make more ’high
contingency’ judgments with low US density, whereas the sensitivity to contingency
information did not vary considerably with US density. Though the density effect
itself was reversed, the present data thus replicate the finding that outcome density
modulations lead to changes in response bias rather than in the ability to per-
ceive contingency (Allan et al., 2005, 2008). Nevertheless, US density did affect
contingency judgments and is assumed to have successfully altered the participants’
propositional knowledge about the CS-US relationship.
The evaluative rating differences were affected by US valence (EC effect) and by
a three-way interaction of valence, contingency, and US density. This indicates that
the impact of US density on EC depends on the level of contingency: Whereas the
magnitude of EC was insensitive to (or tended to increase with) US density in the
high-contingency block, it decreased with US density in the low-contingency block.
According to the referential and the holistic account (Baeyens et al., 1992; Martin
& Levey, 1978), EC should neither depend on contingency nor on US density but
only on the number of CS-US pairings. The present data are at odds with these pre-
dictions because - with constant contiguity - EC was modulated by an interplay of
US density and contingency. By contrast, if EC relies on the same processes that are
involved in Pavlovian signal learning, then the magnitude of EC should be a func-
tion of objective contingency. However, this was not the case in the present study,
either, because reliable effects of EC were observed for ∆P = .5 and for ∆P = .75.
Thus, the present data support the assumption that EC is not sensitive to modu-
lations of the statistical CS-US contingency (Baeyens et al., 1993). Admittedly, an
3A similar pattern of density effects has also been reported in autonomic conditioning where the
magnitude of conditioned skin conductance responses increased when the density of reinforce-
ments was reduced by either varying the number of reinforced trials or the inter-trial interval
(Lachnit, Lober, Reinhard, & Giurfa, 2002; Lachnit, Ludwig, & Reinhard, 2007).
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increase of the CS-US contingency was accompanied with greater EC effects if the
USs occurred frequently, and the EC effect tended to decrease with contingency if
US density was low. According to the propositional account of EC (e.g. De Houwer
et al., 2005; De Houwer, 2007), both contingency and US density should have an
effect on conditioning because both are expected to modulate the crucial proposi-
tional knowledge about the contingency relationship between the CS and the US.
The finding that EC was affected by an interaction of US density and contingency
might thus be accounted best by looking at the produced contingency judgments.
Indeed, both the magnitude of EC and contingency judgments were lowest in the
condition with low contingency and high US density (particularly, in this condi-
tion the evaluative ratings of CSs that were paired with positive USs decreased),
whereas more pronounced EC effects and greater contingency ratings were observed
in the remaining conditions. This pattern of results indicates that EC is sensitive
to contingency judgments rather than to the objective level of contingency and it is
compatible with the propositional account of EC.
In line with this conclusion, the magnitude of EC was found to be positively corre-
lated with contingency judgments: Both types of correlations - within and between
subjects - revealed that stronger perceived contingencies go along with greater eval-
uative learning effects. Admittedly, the correlation does not imply causality, but -
if anything - it appears more plausible that the perception of a high contingency
produces stronger evaluative shifts than the other way around. Thus, in addition to
the observed correlation between EC and contingency awareness (e.g. Stahl et al.,
2009), the present results show that there is also a connection between more quali-
fied propositions about the stimulus relation and the magnitude of EC. Particularly,
the appraisal of strong contingency appears to foster EC in subjects who acquired
knowledge about the contiguities.
To sum up, EC was influenced by an interplay of US density and ∆P both of
which were shown to affect the contingency judgments. Furthermore, EC increased
with contingency judgments, but not with objective contingency. To some extent,
this is in contradiction with dual-process accounts assuming a separate referential
learning system to be responsible for EC (e.g. Baeyens et al., 1992). Instead, the
results imply that propositional knowledge about the CS-US contingency moderates
the acquisition of EC, thus supporting the propositional account (e.g. De Houwer,
2007). Once subjects acquired knowledge about the fact that the respective stimuli
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are being presented contiguously (contingency awareness), elaborated knowledge
about the statistical relationship characterizing the co-occurrences of the CS and
the US appears to further strengthen EC.
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Part III.
Appendix
A. Original instructions (German)
A.1. Instructions belonging to manuscript A
Instruction presented prior to the baseline rating phase
Herzlich Willkommen zu unserem Versuch! Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich bereit
erkla¨rt haben, daran teilzunehmen. Wir werden gleich einige Bildmotive und
Szenarien zeigen, wie sie auch in vielen Werbe- anzeigen zu sehen sind.
Bitte bewerten Sie jedes Bild mo¨glichst spontan nach Ihrem subjektiven
Empfinden. Achten Sie dazu besonders auf den ersten Eindruck, den das Bild
bei Ihnen hinterla¨sst, sobald es erscheint. Unter jedem Bild werden Sie
eine Skala sehen, die von -10 (gefa¨llt mir nicht) bis +10 (gefa¨llt mir
sehr) reicht. Bitte wa¨hlen Sie jeweils einen Ihrem spontanen Empfinden
entsprechenden Zahlenwert, indem Sie mit der linken Maus- taste darauf
klicken. Wir bitten Sie außerdem, wa¨hrend der Durchfu¨hrung des Versuchs
nicht zu sprechen. Falls Sie noch Fragen haben, dann melden Sie sich bitte
jetzt. Dru¨cken Sie die Leertaste, um zu beginnen.
Instruction presented to the awareness-induction group prior
to the acquisition phase
Um allta¨gliche Lebenssituationen zu simulieren (z.B. wenn Sie beim
Einkaufen an diversen Werbeplakaten vorbeigehen), werden wir einige der
Werbeanzeigen nun mehrmals praesentieren. Dabei werden immer jeweils zwei
bestimmte Bilder kurz hintereinander zu sehen sein. Bitte versuchen Sie
sich moeglichst viele dieser Paare zu merken. Am Ende des Versuchs werden
diese in einem Test ab- gefragt werden. Melden Sie sich jetzt, falls Sie
noch Fragen haben. Druecken Sie die Leertaste, um zu beginnen.
Instruction presented to the full-distraction group prior to the
acquisition phase
Um alltaegliche Lebenssituationen zu simulieren (z.B. wenn Sie beim
Einkaufen an diversen Werbeplakaten vorbeigehen), werden wir einige
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der Werbeanzeigen nun mehrmals praesentieren. Eine typische Aufgabe
in solchen Situationen ist es, kleine Kopfrechnungen (z.B. Preise
addieren) durchzufuehren. Sie werden darum neben den Bildern verschiedene
Gleichungen sehen. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, fuer jede Gleichung zu
entscheiden, ob sie wahr oder falsch ist. Druecken Sie bitte die 1 auf
dem Ziffernblock, wenn die Rechnung falsch ist, und druecken Sie die 3,
wenn die Gleichung wahr ist. Immer nach etwa acht Sekunden wird eine neue
Aufgabe erscheinen. Sobald die neue Rechenaufgabe erscheint, loesen Sie
bitte diese, auch wenn Sie mit der vorigen Aufgabe noch nicht fertig sind.
Bitte loesen Sie die Aufgaben so schnell und korrekt wie moeglich. Nachdem
Sie eine Taste gedrueckt haben, wird oben angezeigt, ob Ihre Antwort
korrekt oder falsch war. Wenden Sie Ihren Blick bitte nie vom Bildschirm
ab, damit Sie keine Aufgabe verpassen. Sehen Sie sich auch die Bilder
an. Melden Sie sich jetzt, falls Sie noch Fragen haben. Druecken Sie die
Leertaste, um zu beginnen.
Instruction presented to the contingency-distraction group
prior to the acquisition phase
Um allta¨gliche Lebenssituationen zu simulieren (z.B. wenn Sie beim
Einkaufen an diversen Werbeplakaten vorbeigehen), werden wir einige
der Werbeanzeigen nun mehrmals pra¨sentieren. Eine Gedaechtnisaufgabe
in solchen Situationen koennte es sein, sich bestimmte Artikelnummern
zu merken. In diesem Versuch ist darum jedem Bild eine bestimmte Ziffer
(1, 2 oder 3) zugeordnet. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, die zu jeder Werbeanzeige
geho¨rige Ziffer zu lernen. Bitte druecken Sie dazu, sobald ein Bild
erscheint auf eine Taste auf dem Ziffern- block. Anfangs muessen Sie
natuerlich einfach raten. Sie werden dann jeweils eine Rueckmeldung
bekommen, die Ihnen sagt, ob dies die richtige Ziffer war. Jedes Bild
wird immer nur kurz zu sehen sein. Druecken Sie darum moeglichst schnell
eine Taste. Melden Sie sich jetzt, falls Sie noch Fragen haben. Druecken
Sie die Leertaste, um zu beginnen.
Instruction presented prior to the test phase
Es ist durchaus mo¨glich, dass sich Bewertungen vera¨ndern. Wir mo¨chten
Sie daher bitten, einige Bilder erneut zu bewerten. Geben Sie dazu bitte
wieder Ihre spontane Bewertung ab, indem Sie auf einen Zahlenwert zwischen
-10 (gefa¨llt mir nicht) und +10 (gefa¨llt mir sehr) klicken. Haben Sie noch
Fragen? Weiter mit Leertaste.
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Instruction presented prior to awareness assessment
In der folgenden Aufgabe werden Sie in unregelma¨ßigen Absta¨nden
hintereinander einige Bilder und Wo¨rter auf dem Bildschirm sehen. Bei
den Wo¨rtern wird es sich um eindeutig positive oder negative Substantive
handeln. Ihre Aufgabe ist es nun, das Wort jeweils so schnell und korrekt
wie mo¨glich als positiv oder negativ einzustufen. Verwenden Sie dazu bitte
einfach die Maus: Dru¨cken Sie die rechte Maustaste, wenn das Wort positiv
ist und dru¨cken Sie die linke Maustaste, wenn es negativ ist. Immer kurz
vor einem Wort wird ein Bild er- scheinen. Dieses ko¨nnen Sie ignorieren,
bewerten Sie diesmal bitte nur die Wo¨rter. Legen Sie die Finger nun bitte
jetzt bequem auf die beiden Maustasten. Melden Sie sich jetzt, falls Sie
Fragen haben. Dru¨cken Sie die Leertaste, um zu beginnen.
A.2. Instructions belonging to manuscript B
Instruction presented prior to the baseline rating phase
Herzlich Willkommen zu unserem Versuch!
Phase 1: Namen bewerten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich bereit erkla¨rt haben, daran teilzunehmen.
Wir suchen geeignete Namen fu¨r verschiedene gute und bo¨se Charaktere
einer neuen Comicserie. Darum mo¨chten wir herausfinden, welche Namen
eher angenehm, welche eher neutral und welche eher unangenehm klingen.
Im Folgenden werden Sie eine Reihe von mo¨glichen Namen sehen. Ihre Auf-
gabe ist es, diese spontan nach Ihrem subjektiven Gefallen zu bewerten.
Dazu wird jeweils eine Skala von -10 (sehr unangenehm) u¨ber 0 (neutral)
bis +10 (sehr angenehm) angezeigt. Bitte stufen Sie jeden Namen ein, indem
Sie mit der Maus auf ein Feld dieser Skala klicken. Denken Sie bitte nicht
lange nach,sondern verlassen Sie sich auf Ihr unmittelbares Gefu¨hl. Wenn
Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an die Versuchsleitung.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Dru¨cken Sie eine beliebige Taste, um zu beginnen.
Instruction presented prior to the acquisition phase
(experiments 1 and 2)
Phase 2: Vor- und Nachnamen lernen
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Um herauszufinden, welche Kombinationen von Namen besonders gut im Ge-
da¨chtnis bleiben, werden wir Ihnen im Folgenden die Vor- und Nachnamen
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einiger Charaktere zusammen darbieten. Bitte versuchen Sie, sich diese
Namenspaare so gut wie mo¨glich zu merken. Sagen Sie sich die Namen
dazu innerlich vor, damit Sie sich den Klang einpra¨gen. Sprechen Sie
die Namen aber bitte NICHT laut aus. Am Ende des Versuchs werden wir
ab- fragen, an wieviele Paare Sie sich noch erinnern. Unmittelbar vor
jedem Namenspaar wird eine kurze Mitteilung angezeigt. Wenn Sie dort die
Anweisung "Sprechen Sie bitte" lesen, dann sprechen Sie bitte die Worte
"drei-vier-fu¨nf-drei-vier-fu¨nf.." so lange langsam, laut und deutlich
aus bis die na¨chste Mitteilung erscheint. Wenn Sie die Anweisung "Ruhe
bitte" lesen, dann sprechen Sie bitte nicht. Hin und wieder werden Sie
eine Stimme aus dem Kopfho¨rer ho¨ren. Diese ko¨nnen Sie einfach ignorieren.
Konzentrieren Sie sich bitte darauf, die Namenspaare zu lernen und genau
dann zu sprechen, wenn es verlangt wird. Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben,
wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an die Versuchsleitung.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bitte setzen Sie nun die Kopfho¨rer auf und dru¨cken Sie eine beliebige
Taste, um zu beginnen.
Instruction presented prior to the acquisition phase
(experiment 3)
Phase 2: Namenpaare lernen
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Um herauszufinden, welche Namenskombinationen besonders gut im Ge-
da¨chtnis bleiben, werden wir Ihnen im Folgenden jeweils zwei Namen kurz
hintereinander darbieten. Bitte versuchen Sie, sich so viele dieser
Namenpaare wie mo¨glich zu merken. Sie ko¨nnen sich die Namen innerlich
vorsagen, sprechen sie sie aber bitte nicht laut aus. Am Ende des
Versuchs werden wir in einem Test abfragen, wieviele Paare sie noch er-
innern. Wa¨hrend Sie die Namen sehen, werden Sie mehrere Hintergrund-
gera¨usche ho¨ren. Dies soll eine typische Gera¨uschkulisse simulieren und
die Aufgabe dadurch etwas erschweren. Sie ko¨nnen die Gera¨usche einfach
ignorieren. Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an den
Versuchsleiter.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bitte setzen Sie nun die Kopfho¨rer auf (Kabel links) und dru¨cken Sie eine
beliebige Taste, um zu beginnen.
Instruction presented prior to the test phase
Phase 3: Namen bewerten
--------------------------------------------------------------------- Sie
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ko¨nnen die Kopfho¨rer nun wieder abnehmen. Wir mo¨chten Sie jetzt bitten,
nochmals eine Reihe von Namen zu bewerten. Bitte stufen Sie diese wieder
spontan auf einer Skala von -10 (sehr unangenehm) u¨ber 0 (neutral) bis
+10 (sehr angenehm) ein. Denken Sie dabei bitte nicht lange nach, sondern
verlassen Sie sich wieder auf Ihr unmittelbares Gefu¨hl. Wenn Sie noch
Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte jetzt an die Versuchsleitung.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Dru¨cken Sie eine beliebige Taste, um zu beginnen.
Instruction presented prior to the awareness assessment
Phase 4: Wiedererkennungstest
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Das Experiment ist nun fast zu Ende. Wir mo¨chten nun testen, wie viele
Namenpaare Sie sich merken konnten. Dazu werden Sie im Folgenden auf dem
Bildschirm jeweils sechs Namenspaare sehen, von denen aber nur eines so
in der Lernaufgabe enthalten war. Bitte klicken Sie jeweils auf das Feld
neben dem korrekten Namenspaar. Bitte entscheiden Sie sich immer fu¨r ein
Paar, auch wenn Sie sich nicht sicher sind! Haben Sie noch Fragen?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weiter mit beliebiger Taste.
A.3. Instructions belonging to manuscript C
General instruction paper explaining the multiple-contingency
learning task (given to the participants prior to the experiment)
Herzlich Willkommen zu unserem Versuch!
Wir interessieren uns dafuer, wie gut Menschen lernen koennen, dass
einzelne Gera¨usche bestimmte Ereignisse ankuendigen.
Der Versuch besteht aus mehreren Phasen. Zuna¨chst muessen Sie eine
Reihe von Gera¨uschen moeglichst spontan danach beurteilen, wie angenehm
bzw. unangenehm sie klingen. Wir bitten Sie, jedes Gera¨usch auf einer
Skala von -10 (sehr unangenehm) ueber 0 (neutral) bis +10 (sehr angenehm)
einzustufen.
Danach folgen vier getrennte Lernphasen, in denen Gera¨usche und Bilder
in schneller Abfolge mehrmals hintereinander dargeboten werden. Bestimmte
Gera¨usche kuendigen dabei jeweils bestimmte Bilder mehr oder weniger
zuverla¨ssig an. Insgesamt werden vier verschiedene Ereignisse auftreten:
1. Das Gera¨usch und das Bild werden zusammen dargeboten.
2. Das Gera¨usch ertoent, aber es erscheint kein Bild.
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3. Das Bild erscheint ohne dass es durch ein Gera¨usch angekuendigt
wurde.
4. Weder Gera¨usch noch Bild werden dargeboten.
Alle vier Ereignisse werden Sie fuer die verschiedenen Paare von Bildern
und Gera¨uschen mehrmals beobachten. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, zu lernen, wie
zuverla¨ssig jedes einzelne Bild durch eines der Gera¨usche angekuendigt
wird. Nachdem ein Block von Darbietungen (ca. 3 Minuten) beendet ist,
werden wir Sie bitten, zuna¨chst das jeweils zu einem Gera¨usch gehoerende
Bild anzugeben und schließlich die Sta¨rke des Zusammenhangs fuer jedes
Gera¨usch-Bild-Paars auf einer Skala von 0 (kein Zusammenhang) bis 100
(starker Zusammenhang) einzeln einzustufen.
Ein starker Zusammenhang bedeutet, dass das Ertoenen eines Gera¨uschs
das Erscheinen eines Bilds vorhersagt: Die meiste Zeit, wenn das Gera¨usch
ertoente, erschien auch das Bild und die meiste Zeit, wenn das Gera¨usch
nicht ertoente, erschien auch das Bild nicht. Ein schwacher Zusammenhang
bedeutet, dass ein Bild nach einem Gera¨usch ebenso oft erschien wie ohne
das Gera¨usch. Das Bild konnte durch das Gera¨usch also nicht vorhergesagt
werden. u¨berlegen Sie bitte fuer jedes Paar, ob der Zusammenhang eher
stark oder schwach ist.
Haben Sie Fragen?
Instructions presented prior to the baseline rating phase
Herzlich Willkommen zu unserem Versuch! Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich bereit
erkla¨rt haben, teilzunehmen. Wir mo¨chten Sie nun bitten, eine Reihe von
Gera¨uschen danach zu bewerten, wie angenehm bzw. unangenehm Sie diese
empfinden. Sie werden jeweils zuerst ein Gera¨usch ho¨ren und anschließend
eine Skala sehen, die von -10 bis +10 reicht: -10 = "sehr unangenehm"
0 = "neutral" +10 = "sehr angenehm" Bitte bewerten Sie jedes Gera¨usch
mo¨glichst spontan indem Sie mit der linken Maustaste auf ein Feld des
Skala klicken. Wenn Sie das Gera¨usch nochmals ho¨ren mo¨chten, ko¨nnen Sie
auf das kleine Quadrat links oben klicken. Denken Sie bei der Bewertung
aber bitte nicht lange nach, sondern verlassen Sie sich auf Ihren ersten
Eindruck. Falls Sie noch Fragen haben, dann ko¨nnen Sie sich jetzt an
die Versuchsleitung wenden. Setzen Sie dann bitte die Kopfho¨rer auf und
dru¨cken Sie die Leertaste, um zu beginnen.
Instructions presented prior to the first learning block
Lernphase I
-----------
Sie werden nun verschiedene Gera¨usche und Bilder mehrmals hintereinander
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ho¨ren und sehen. Jedes Gera¨usch ku¨ndigt dabei jeweils ein bestimmtes Bild
mehr oder weniger zuverla¨ssig an. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, zu lernen, wie gut
jedes der Ge- ra¨usche ein bestimmtes Bild vorhersagt. Achten Sie dabei
bitte nicht nur auf die Fa¨lle, in denen Sie ein bestimmtes Bild nach einem
Gera¨usch sehen, sondern achten Sie auch auf die Fa¨lle, in denen kein Bild
nach demselben Gera¨usch er- scheint oder das Bild ohne Anku¨ndigung durch
ein Gera¨usch erscheint. Sie werden anschließend gebeten, die Sta¨rke des
Zusammenhangs fu¨r jedes Gera¨usch-Bild-Paar auf einer Skala von 0 bis
100 anzugeben. Haben Sie noch Fragen? Dru¨cken Sie die Leertaste um zu
starten.
Instructions presented after the first learning block
Testphase I
-----------
Nun folgt der Test zu den bisher dargebotenen Gera¨uschen und Bildern. Sie
werden jeweils eines der Gera¨usche ho¨ren. Stufen Sie bitte zuerst ein, wie
angenehm bzw. unangenehm Sie das Gera¨usch finden. Wa¨hlen Sie dann das Bild
aus, das mit dem Gera¨usch gekoppelt war. Wa¨hlen Sie bitte auch ein Bild
aus, wenn Sie sich nicht ganz sicher sind. Stufen Sie anschließend auf
einer Skala von 0 (= kein Zusammenhang) bis 100 (= starker Zusammenhang)
ein, wie zuverla¨ssig das Bild durch das jeweilige Gera¨usch Ihrer Meinung
nach vorhergesagt wurde. Haben Sie noch Fragen? Dru¨cken Sie die Leertaste,
um zu beginnen.
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